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SABRETACHE

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The aims of the Society are the encouragement and pursuit of study and research in military history, customs, traditions, dress, arms, equipment and kindred matters; the promotion of public interest and knowledge in these subjects, and the preservation of historical military objects with particular reference to the armed forces of Australia.

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Editorial

After every major conflict comes a time of reflection and appraisal. The Australian involvement in Afghanistan is no different, particularly due to its duration. Tactics and equipment were developed and used that were specific to that theatre which are not necessarily usable elsewhere. While the lessons learnt process is invaluable in order to improve operational outcomes, the need for rapid transition for future conflicts is vital. Gaps in force posture policy and preparedness can prove costly. Australia is now at a moment whereby its defence forces require immediate policy that prepares for possible conflict in the near future. To better reflect the rapidly changing circumstances, the federal government needs to conduct a formal review of its force posture, building on the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. While Prime Minister Morrison, when launching the update, drew the analogy with the period leading up to the Second World War, there lacks an urgency. Certainly, the pandemic has dominated government focus, and rightly so. However, those agents that intend to expand their influence and power have also used the time to their advantage. It is vital that Australia's defence forces are supported with the right equipment, training and policy to protect Australia and its interests in the region.

Justin Chadwick

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Field Marshal William Birdwood's Foreign Military Orders

John Meyers¹

On Wednesday 1 December 2021 Spink Auctions in London commenced selling four of the five known foreign orders to Field Marshal William Birdwood, 1st Baron Birdwood of Anzac and Totnes GCB, GCSI, GCMG, GCVO, CIE, DSO and they were purchased by the Maryborough Military & Colonial Museum. After his death in 1951 it is understood that Birdwood's British and foreign orders went to one part of the family and the decorations and medal group went to another part of the family. In the 1970's, all the orders were sold and later the medal group was purchased by the Australian War Memorial, where they are on display. It is not known where the British orders are located, but after approximately 46 years the foreign orders finally surfaced at the Spink auction. Spink advises that only one collector custodian has held them in all that time.

Description of the orders

Belgian Order of the Crown 1st class Star (One of only eight for the Great War)

Egyptian Order of the Nile 2nd class

Portugese Order of the Tower & Sword collar chain set (One of only two for the Great War)

Portugese Order of St Avis 2nd class.

There is a fifth order and it was probably handed in at the outbreak of the Second World War. It was the Japanese Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.

The four Orders have engraved naming on the reverse sides. They read:

Lieut General Sir W.R. Birdwood. A & N.Z. Corps. 1916

Lieut General Sir W.R. Birdwood. A & N.Z. Corps

General Sir W.R. Birdwood. Commanding V Army

General Sir W.R. Birdwood. Commanding V Army

¹ John Meyers is a Fellow of the MHSA and a significant contributor to Australian military history through his work at the Maryborough Military & Colonial Museum.

Birdwood: A brief biography

Birdwood was born in India in 1865, educated in England and attended the Royal Military College at Sandhurst before being posted back to India where he served on the North West Frontier. Birdwood served on Lord Kitchener's staff during the Boer War and was awarded a DSO in India in 1908. In 1911, he was promoted to the rank of major general and in December 1914, Kitchener posted him to Egypt where he was given command of the Australian and New Zealand Forces with the rank of lieutenant general. He landed at Gallipoli on the 25 April 1915 and continued in command until the withdrawal back to Egypt in early 1916. Following the Anzac buildup in Egypt in February and March 1916 Birdwood was given command of I ANZAC Corps and went to France and Belgium. In November 1917 he took command of the Australian Corps that included the five AIF divisions. In May 1918 he was succeeded by Lieutenant General Sir John Monash and then took command



Image 1: Field Marshal William Birdwood, 1st Baron Birdwood of Anzac and Totnes GCB, GCSI, GCMG, GCVO, CIE, DSO. Source: Author.

of the Fifth British Army for the remainder of the war with the rank of general.

In 1920 Birdwood toured Australia and New Zealand where he was well received by the returned soldiers and women. At that time he was appointed an honorary general in the Australian Military Forces. Later he held senior positions in the Indian Army and was promoted to the rank of field marshal in 1925 when he became the commander-in-chief.

Birdwood retired to England where he died in 1951 at Hampton Court Palace and was buried at Twickenham Cemetery with full military honours.

Our museum was most fortunate to be able to acquire these historically significant orders to Field Marshal Birdwood, who commanded the Australian Imperial Force for most of the First World War, which included the New Zealand Force on Gallipoli. Bidding on these orders was competitive and the final price came to \$40,000.



Image 2: Belgian Order of the Crown 1st class Star. Source: Author.



Image 3: Egyptian Order of the Nile 2nd class. Source: Author.



Image 4: Portuguese Order of the Tower and Sword collar chain set. Source: Author.



Image 5: Portuguese Order of St Alvis 2nd class. Source: Author.

'Greedy Eye of the Orient and the Thunderclouds of War'

Populist media representation of Australian defence matters and the formation of public opinion during the interwar period

Justin Chadwick¹

Introduction

Daily newspapers and periodicals of the popular press dominated the means of information distribution to Australians in the early to mid-twentieth century. The newspaper, syndicated throughout the country and published locally in a competitive marketplace, contained regional, national and international news. Periodicals, like *The Bulletin* and *The Lone Hand*, gave readers long-form articles of national and international interest as well as short stories and reviews. For Australians in the early twentieth century print media was the easiest and cheapest form of news and information.

While not necessarily able to form people's opinions, the media can focus public attention on specific issues and influence them. Walter Lippmann, writing in *Public Opinion* (1922), argued that the world's complexity challenged most people, leading them to rely on others to summarise and analyse events. For Lippmann, under certain circumstances people 'respond as powerfully to fictions as they do to realities, and that in many cases they help to create the very fictions to which they respond'.² His term 'manufacturing consent' referred to the management of public opinion to the benefit of powerful groups and has become synonymous with propaganda. Public relations pioneer Edward Bernays expanded on Lippmann's work. In *Propaganda* (1928), Bernays wrote that the 'conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society ... our minds are molded, our tastes are formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of'.³ David Altheide argues in *Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis* (2002) that fear, 'with enough repetition and expanded use' becomes 'a way of looking at life'.⁴ In *Fear: The History of a*

1 Justin Chadwick holds a PhD in history from the University of Adelaide. He is the author of *Sword and Baton: Senior Australian Army Officers from Federation to 2001* series of books and numerous articles on Australian and military history. He is the editor of *Sabretache*.

2 Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, Macmillan Company: New York, (1922), p. 14.

3 Edward Bernays, *Propaganda*, Liveright Publishing: New York, (1928), p. 9.

4 David Altheide, *Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis*, Aldine de Gruyter: New York, (2002), p. 3.

Political Idea (2004), Corey Robin argues that fear unites populations and ‘as the ground of our public life, we refuse to see the grievances and controversies that underlie it’.⁵ Continued exposure to reportage and editorials that espoused concern over the safety of Australia and its place in the Pacific influenced public opinion.

This paper will argue that Australian interwar defence policy debate was informed by publications and the media. Works of fiction and non-fiction, news periodicals and newspapers all contributed to broadening the public’s awareness of defence preparedness. The discussion was not limited to Australian authors, but attracted interest from writers in Britain, the United States and Japan. The increased awareness of the public through these works gave those interested an opportunity to promote their agenda of defence policy reform. Without an informed—and fearful—public, the desire for change proposed by these agents would have gained little attention. This paper will explore the development of invasion literature and its impact in Australia, the raising of defence awareness by local and international authors, newspapers and periodicals, highlighting the increased fear of Japanese imperialism and demand for defence improvements.

Invasion anxiety: the impact of published works on defence awareness

Invasion anxiety in English literature developed in Britain during the nineteenth century. The first substantial example of what was to be a long line of popular invasion-scare literature was *The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer* (1871).⁶ Set half a century after a successful German invasion of England, the book—published anonymously—was intended to raise awareness of the poor state of defence preparedness and the indifference of the government and public.⁷ Published soon after the Prussian victory over France, the narrator of *The Battle of Dorking* tells his audience of an empire under pressure and over-stretched that succumbs to an invasion which results in the impoverishment of Britain’s populace and the dismemberment of the empire. The outcome, the narrator concludes, could have been averted with ‘a little firmness and self-denial, or political courage and foresight ... A nation too selfish to defend its liberty, could not have been fit to retain it’.⁸ First published in the May 1871 edition of *Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine*, *The Battle of Dorking* was reprinted six times and then issued as a pamphlet, selling 110,000 copies by July, reaching an international audience and translated into various European

5 Corey Robin, *Fear: The History of a Political Idea*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, (2004), p. 3.

6 George Chesney, *The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer*, William Blackwood and Sons: Edinburgh, (1871).

7 A Michael Matin, ‘Scrutinizing The Battle of Dorking: The Royal United Service Institution and the mid-Victorian Invasion Controversy’, *Victorian Literature and Culture*, 39 (2011): 385-407.

8 Chesney, *The Battle of Dorking*, p. 64.

languages.⁹ For science fiction critic, Brian Stableford, *The Battle of Dorking* had ‘the almost unique feat of starting off a literary tradition single-handed’.¹⁰ Ignatius Clarke—who termed the phrase ‘future war fiction’—noted that the factual pamphlet was replaced by the short story as the primary method of dissemination of invasion fears.¹¹ Interest in the genre was due to an increase in literacy, particularly among the working class, and development of cheaper media, such as Northcliffe’s penny press.¹² For literary scholar Frederic Krome, these stories ‘should not be primarily understood as predictors of the future, but are rather assertions of the hopes, fears, aspirations, and anxieties of the period that produces them’.¹³ Michael Matin argues that while serving officers may appear ‘unlikely authors of creative literature, the fact that they wrote fiction actually makes a great deal of sense’. These fictional narratives ‘were essentially descriptions of eventualities of a sort that war planners had been developing for generations’ but appealed to a wide readership rather than an educated minority or members of the armed forces.¹⁴ *The Battle of Dorking* was followed by numerous novels in the same genre, many written by British officers.¹⁵ Historian Barbara Tuchman noted that early twentieth century Britain’s fear of invasion had become ‘almost a psychosis’.¹⁶ Such was the widespread nature of this form of fiction, comic novelist PG Wodehouse satirised it in *The Swoop* (1909), in which Britain is saved from invasion from various countries (including the Swiss navy and canoe-paddling cannibals) by a boy scout. As Ailise Bulfin has identified, invasion-scare literature reflected late-Victorian imperialism and its ongoing colonial wars that strained military resources.¹⁷ What



9 IF Clarke, *The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914*, Syracuse University Press: Syracuse, (1995), p. 14.

10 Brian Stableford, *Scientific Romance in Britain 1890-1950*, Fourth Estate: London, (1985), p. 30.

11 IF Clarke, ‘Before and After The Battle of Dorking’, *Science Fiction Studies*, 24 (1997): pp. 33-46.

12 Roger Luckhurst, *Science Fiction*, Polity: Cambridge, (2005), p. 16.

13 Frederic Krome, *Fighting the Future War: An Anthology of Science Fiction War Stories, 1914-1945*, Routledge: New York, (2012), p. 2.

14 A Michael Matin, ‘The Creativity of War Planners: Armed Forces Professionals and the Pre-1914 British Invasion-Scare Genre’, *ELH*, 78 (2011), p. 803.

15 For example, General Sir William Francis Butler, *The Invasion of England: Told Twenty Years After* (1882); Lieutenant Colonel Sir George Sydenham Clarke, *The Last Great Naval War* (1892); Colonel FN Maude, *The New Battle of Dorking* (1900); Major Guy du Maurier, *An Englishman’s Home* (1909) and Captain RCT Evans, *A Scheme for the Invasion of England* (1914).

16 Barbara Tuchman, *The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War 1890-1914*, Macmillan: New York, (1962), p. 380.

17 Ailise Bulfin, “‘To Arms!’: Invasion Narratives and Late-Victorian Literature”, *Literature Compass*, 12 (2015): pp. 482-496.

happened at the centre of empire was reflected at its periphery.

British invasion-scare literature was emulated in Australia. Colonial novelists copied Britain's fears which fluctuated between Germany, Russia and France. An early example was David Burn's 1845 play 'Sydney Delivered; or, the Princely Buccaneer' which showed militarily unprepared Australian colonies.¹⁸ Russia was the focus of George Ranken's novel *The Invasion* (1877) which developed the concept of an innate soldierly ability in colonists. However, by the late nineteenth century Australian novelists focused on an Asian invasion, what Philip Steer has argued as a distinctive local literary form.¹⁹ Catriona Ross aptly describes the corpus as

alarmist, didactic texts that call for a massive strengthening of national defense by illustrating the ease with which Australia could be invaded under the present circumstances and by detailing the gruesome horrors the populace would suffer at the hands of Asian invaders.²⁰

The inability of Australia to protect itself from invasion is commonly attributed to increased urbanisation, a small population and lack of defence readiness. These were reflected in pre-Federation invasion literature such as William Lane's *White or Yellow?: A Story of the Race-War of AD 1908* (1888), *The Battle of Mordialloc, or How We Lost Australia* (1888) published anonymously, and Kenneth Mackay's *The Yellow Wave: A Romance of the Asiatic Invasion of Australia* (1895). An idealistic socialist, Lane's writing enriched the 'hypochondria' of Australian identity.²¹ The focus of these novels was China, often in conjunction with Russia. Mackay, an adept horseman who raised a militia light horse unit, found success in writing rather than prospecting on the Victorian goldfields, publishing his first book in 1887.²² For Russell Blackford *The Yellow Wave* 'is undoubtedly one of the most important of the novels of racial invasion of this period'²³ and, as noted by Mark Bould and Sherryl Vint, reinforces traditional distributions of power.²⁴ Set in 1954, *The Yellow Wave* reflected much of Mackay's ideals of the bush and horsemanship and was influenced by Charles Pearson's notion of national degeneration in *National Life and Character* (1893). A

18 William H Wilde, Joy Hooton and Barry Andrews, *The Oxford Companion to Australian Literature*, (2 ed), Oxford University Press: Melbourne: (1994), p. 128.

19 Philip Steer, *Settler Colonialism in Victorian Literature: Economics and Political Identity in the Networked of Empire*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, (2020), p. 166.

20 Catriona Ross, 'Paranoid Projections: Australian Novels of Asian Invasion', *Antipodes*, 23 (2009), p. 9.

21 David Crouch, *Colonial Psychosocial: Reading William Lane*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne, (2014), 15.

22 Justin Chadwick, *Sword and Baton: Senior Australian Officers from Federation to 2011*, Volume 1, Big Sky Publishing: Newport, (2017), pp. 436-437.

23 Russell Blackford, 'Those Foreign Devils', *Science Fiction Studies*, 30 (2003), p. 518.

24 Mark Bould and Sherryl Vint, *The Routledge Concise History of Science Fiction*, Routledge: London, (2011), p. 27.

Russian attack on India diverts British attention leaving Australia defenceless. Led by Russians, the invading force consists predominantly of Chinese troops. The ensuing story—much of it an interpersonal melodrama—is dominated by the desire to ensure an Australia that was white. The hurriedly conscripted Australian forces are defeated by the invaders. The only defence was a small force of irregular cavalry—a concept promoted by Mackay—who put up a desperate fight against the invading hordes. ‘Hatten’s ringers’, named after their leader, were ‘formidable in numbers, and splendid in physique and courage’.²⁵ They personified Mackay’s ideals of Australian masculinity—strong, resourceful, non-urbanised and white.²⁶ Beside clear racial paranoia, *The Yellow Wave* also expressed the cost of disregarding defence preparedness.

The focus of the Asian threat moved from China to Japan following Federation. Japan’s rise as an industrial and colonial power was reinforced by naval visits to Australia in 1903 and 1906, and its victories against China in 1895 and Russia in 1905. Henri Frei, in *Japan’s Southward Advance* (1991), noted that the Japanese victory in 1895 focused Australian attention away from China as the source of menace which was further complicated by the Anglo-Japanese alliance. A ‘significant sector of Australians’, he wrote, ‘believed that Japan was standing by to sail across the Pacific and invade Australia’.²⁷ Editor of Sydney’s *Sunday Times*, Thomas Roydhouse’s novel *The Coloured Conquest* was published in 1904 under the pseudonym Rata. Set in 1913, Japan has driven Russia from Manchuria and incited Asian populations to revolt in order to create a world dominated by Japan. Australia’s ignorance of warnings results in an invasion and enslavement of the white population.²⁸ For the *Sydney Morning Herald’s* reviewer, the novel ‘may serve a good turn if it helps in persuading people to believe that we Australians should perfect our land forces’.²⁹ The last of the pre-war invasion-scare novels produced in Australia was Charles Kirmess’s ‘The Commonwealth Crisis’. First serialised in the *Lone Hand* magazine in 1908, and later published as a book entitled *The Australian Crisis* in 1909, the story was, for David Walker in *Anxious Nation* (1999), ‘one of the best known of the Japanese invasion stories’.³⁰ Set in northern Australia, where the Japanese have already created a foothold, the task of their removal was the responsibility of the ‘White Guard’, a force ‘composed of the sturdy sons of the Australian bush’.³¹ Drawing on the recent visit of the ‘Great White Fleet’ in 1908 as

25 Kenneth Mackay, *The Yellow Wave: A Romance of the Asiatic Invasion of Australia*, Richard Bentley and Son: London, (1895), p. 369.

26 See David Walker, *Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939*, University of Queensland Press: St Lucia, (1999), pp. 105-107.

27 Henri Frei, *Japan’s Southward Advance*, Melbourne University Press: Melbourne (1991), p. 63.

28 Thomas Roydhouse, *The Coloured Conquest*, NSW Bookstall: Sydney, (1904).

29 ‘The Coloured Conquest’, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 August 1904, 8.

30 Walker, *Anxious Nation*, p. 120.

31 CH Kirmess, *The Australian Crisis*, Walter Scott Publishing Company: London, (1909), p. 146.

an example of US interests in the Pacific, Americans came to the assistance of the Australian defenders, creating an international element to the struggle. The conflict is concluded with the secession of territory. The Australian Crisis had the dual warning of the Japanese desire — perceived or otherwise — to colonise northern Australia and the need for defence against such attempts. In his introduction to the book, Kirmess wrote that Australians ‘seem to have no imagination at all where the future safety of the nation is concerned’.³² What these two books demonstrate is the changed focus of the perceived danger from invasion. As Japan had developed into a modern state, the country took on attributes of a major imperialist power that increasingly worried many Australians.

Concern over Australia’s vulnerability was not limited to novelists. The chief law reporter for the Sydney Sun, George Marks had an interest in military matters.³³ He wrote articles for the Navy League Journal as well as six books, including *Watch the Pacific! Defenceless Australia* (1924) and *Pacific Peril, or, Menace of Japan’s Mandated Islands* (1933). Stressing the vulnerability of the Australian coastline he called for urgent action to protect against invasion through a strengthened navy and commonality of railway gauges to shuttle troops and equipment rapidly.³⁴

In *Pacific Peril* Marks identified menace in Japan’s imperialist actions in China and that having control of Mandated Territories in the South Pacific placed it perilously close to Australia. Common to other analysts of the period, he argued that the Pacific was to be the epicentre of world geostrategy. The nation, wrote Marks, that ‘gains the naval supremacy of the Pacific becomes the dictator of the world’.³⁵ The book’s jingoistic racism—prevalent throughout—was representative of the anti-Japanese sentiment that increased following Japan’s 1932 invasion of China. Edmund Piesse, senior foreign policy analyst for the government, had by this time altered his optimistic outlook toward Japan. Writing under the pseudonym Albatross—a bird that patrols the Southern and Pacific oceans—Piesse published a treatise entitled *Japan and the Defence of Australia* in November 1935. As the threat of war in Europe increased, Piesse argued that Australia could not rely on the British fleet leaving northern waters to defend Australia. Without guaranteed British naval support and Australia’s inability



32 Kirmess, *The Australian Crisis*, p. 6.

33 ‘Obituary’, *Sydney Catholic Freeman’s Journal*, 21 February 1935, p. 6.

34 E George Marks, *Watch the Pacific! Defenceless Australia*, Coles Book Arcade: Sydney, (1924).

35 E George Marks, *Pacific Peril, or, Menace of Japan’s Mandated Islands*, Wynyard Book Arcade: Sydney, (1933), p. 65.

36 ‘Albatross’, *Japan and the Defence of Australia*, Robertson & Mullens: Melbourne, (1935).

to build an adequate naval deterrent in time, protection would have to come from the army and air force.³⁶ Lawyer, diplomat and intellectual, Frederic Eggleston, wrote an article for the Melbourne *Herald* in December 1935 that queried the British fleet's ability to 'help Australia or play any part at all in the Northern Pacific' and the capabilities of Singapore. He realised his claims were controversial but believed 'that all Australian military authorities support my view'.³⁷ This conclusion was endorsed by Lieutenant Colonel William Hodgson, the head of the newly established External Affairs Department. Hodgson, a recently retired permanent forces officer with experience in military intelligence, felt that Japan would attack at a time that Britain was focussed on European affairs and was unable, or unwilling, to despatch a fleet. Therefore, he argued, defence should be concentrated on the army and air force.³⁸ The Defence of Australia League—formed in 1933 by former prime minister WM 'Billy' Hughes to promote defence matters—published a collection of Hughes's press articles in *The Price of Peace* (1934). 'Unless we are to stand like sheep baring our throats to the butcher we must', Hughes wrote, 'without delay, create such defence forces as to make an attack upon Australia a venture so hazardous that none will attempt it'.³⁹ Written with a firm sense of social Darwinism, Hughes outlined what he believed were the causes of war, that defence was an essential part of national policy, the rule of law was dependent on force, the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations and the achievement of peace 'through moral regeneration'. Hughes discussed details of the Australian defence forces, their lack of preparedness, the fallacy of relying on the Royal Navy for security and the need for air forces.

The safety of Australia was not the exclusive remit of local authors and analysts. In London, Colonel Percy Etherton and Hessel Tiltman wrote *Japan, Mistress of the Pacific* (1933) which closely examined Japan's imperialist policy. Warning that Japan had 'long cast covetous eyes on the empty North of Australia' whose climate was more 'suitable to the Oriental temperament and constitution', the authors argued that Australia needed to populate.⁴⁰ A Japanese settlement in the north of Australia would soon become a colony, a scenario reminiscent of Kirmess's novel, and 'the stage would be set for a conflagration'.⁴¹ While not directly stating an invasion of Australian territory was Japan's goal, the inference was there. Professor Taid O'Conroy, who had lived and worked in Japan for fifteen years, wrote a survey of Japanese culture and politics in *The Menace of Japan* (1934). His focus was on Japan's expansionist policies that, unless curtailed by the West, would result in 'a

37 FW Eggleston, 'What Does Japan Want in the Pacific?', Melbourne *Herald*, 31 December 1935, p. 6.

38 Neville Meaney, *Fears & Phobias: E.L. Piessie and the Problem of Japan, 1909-39*, National Library of Australia: Canberra, (1996), p. 44.

39 WM Hughes, *The Price of Peace*, The Defence of Australia League: Sydney, (1934), p. 6.

40 PT Etherton and Hessel Tiltman, *Japan, Mistress of the Pacific*, Jarrold Publishing: London, (1933), pp. 220-225.

41 Etherton and Tiltman, *Japan, Mistress of the Pacific*, p. 41.

greater war than that of 1914-18' that 'will be fought on Asiatic soil'.⁴² Commenting on Australia, O'Conroy noted that Australia featured in Japanese plans, the climate suited them and that had been insulted by the White Australia Policy.⁴³ Japan, he warned 'wants war'.⁴⁴ International publications on Japanese intentions added to local fears and raised awareness of defence preparedness.

These works built on a literature that had developed during the First World War that questioned Japanese intentions. Pamphlets, such as *Is Japan a Menace to Asia?* (1917), and books, like *The Menace of Japan* (1917) and *Does Japan Menace the United States?* (1916), outlined Japan's regional ascendancy and queried responses by other nations.⁴⁵ Jabez Sunderland's *Rising Japan* (1918) analysed the possibility of a Japanese invasion of California, though concludes that it was unlikely and amicable relations should be promoted between the two countries.⁴⁶ In *The Problem of the Pacific* (1919) Brunson Fletcher explored the history of the Pacific powers and their interaction. He concluded by discussing the Japanese importation of 'German jingoism', the greater closeness of the English-speaking countries of the Pacific brought about by the war and the need for Australia to populate its north.⁴⁷ This view was endorsed by Russian general and military historian Nikolai Golovin in *The Pacific in the Twentieth Century* (1922). Written prior to the Washington Conference, Golovin argued that Japan sought expansion to accommodate its growing population and the 'longer Japan is prevented from sending out settlers to suitable countries, the stronger will the explosion be'.⁴⁸ Japanese policy, argued Golovin, was aggressive and would only achieve its conclusion with dominance of the Pacific. Hector Bywater, in *Sea-Power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem* (1921), raised the soured relations between Britain and Japan following the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It is 'desirable that the British people should know', wrote Bywater, of the 'significant change of feeling on the part of a nation which they have long been accustomed to regard and treat as a staunch friend'.⁴⁹ The rise of militarism—'imbued with the political doctrines of the Prussian school and hypnotised by the shibboleths which lured Germany to her ruin'—had been supported by a jingoistic press and nationalistic businesses.⁵⁰

42 Taid O'Conroy, *The Menace of Japan*, Hurst & Blackett: London, (1934), p. 283.

43 O'Conroy, *The Menace of Japan*, pp. 278-279.

44 O'Conroy, *The Menace of Japan*, p. 284.

45 Taraknath Das, *Is Japan a Menace to Asia?* Self-published: Shanghai, (1917); Chugo Ohira, *Does Japan Menace the United States?* (New York: Japanese-American Commercial Weekly, 1916); Frederick McCormick, *The Menace of Japan*, Little Brown: Boston, (1917).

46 Jabez Sunderland, *Rising Japan*, GP Putnam: New York, (1918).

47 C Brunson Fletcher, *The Problem of the Pacific*, Henry Holt and Company: New York, (1919).

48 Nikolai Golovin, *The Pacific in the Twentieth Century*, Glydendal: London, (1922), p. 87.

49 Hector Bywater, *Sea-Power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem*, Houghton Mifflin: New York, (1921), p. 310.

50 Bywater, *Sea-Power in the Pacific*, p. 317.

For Bywater Japan could satisfy its over-population problems in China as it had begun in Korea and Formosa. The common theme throughout was one of Japanese expansionism and an inevitable clash with Western powers.

Commentary on Japan's expansionist policy also came from within. The publication of Tota Ishimaru's *Japan Must Fight Britain* (1936) caused a sensation in the Australian press with its claim that unless Japan ceased its expansionist policy war was inevitable.⁵¹ After discussing all aspects of Japan's potential aggression, such as causing insurrection in India and Egypt, and the country's options against Britain and the US, Ishimaru analysed an attack on Australia. The rapid capture of Hong Kong and Singapore and reduction of the British fleet, 'by sinking three or four of the China Squadron cruisers at the outset', would provide Japan the opportunity to strike further south. No attempt to occupy Australia or New Zealand could be made until command of the sea had been achieved and until then the attackers 'would have to be content with bombarding from the sea or bombing from the air parts of those countries, in the hope of destroying public works and of intimidating the people'.⁵² Distance would initially limit attacks to the north of Australia and naval activity to submarines with the focus being Sydney. Arguing that Japan was a country equal to Britain and the US, Ishimaru called for the creation of spheres of influence in the Pacific. Each Power would

respect the wishes of the others, honestly assist their progress and development, finally abandon all ideas of racial discrimination and hatred, remove all tariff walls and restrictions on migration, encourage the settlement of differences by an efficient system of arbitration.⁵³

Arms limitation and peace would then be achieved. The key to the Pacific, concluded Ishimaru, was Britain. Newspaper response in Australia ranged from understated to sensational. The Melbourne *Weekly Times* reviewed the book under the heading, 'Japan and Australia',⁵⁴ the Brisbane *Telegraph*, led with 'Japan's War Strategy',⁵⁵ and 'Will Japan Fight?' in the Melbourne *Herald*.⁵⁶ Tabloid newspapers, such as the Sydney's *Sun* and *Truth*, ran with the headlines 'Japan to Invade Australia'⁵⁷ and 'Attack Would Come At Darwin and In North' respectively.⁵⁸ Sensationalist headlines were more prevalent in country newspapers. 'Japan to Invade Australia',

51 Tota Ishimaru, *Japan Must Fight Britain*, Hurst & Blackett: London, (1936).

52 Ishimaru, *Japan Must Fight Britain*, p. 240.

53 Ishimaru, *Japan Must Fight Britain*, p. 280.

54 'Japan and Australia', Melbourne *Weekly Times*, 15 February 1936, p. 12.

55 'Japan's War Strategy' Brisbane *Telegraph*, 7 March 1936, p. 14.

56 'Will Japan Fight?', Melbourne *Herald*, 10 February 1936, p. 7.

57 'Will Japan Fight?', Sydney *Sun*, 2 February 1936, p. 5.

58 'Attack Would Come At Darwin and In North', Sydney *Truth*, 12 April 1936, p. 18.

ran the *Scrutineer and Berrima District Press*,⁵⁹ ‘Sees War! Australia and New Zealand as Prizes’ headlined the *Carcoar Chronicle*⁶⁰ and the Carnarvon *Northern Times* led with ‘Britain and Japan A Conflict Prophesied’.⁶¹ An article in the Brisbane *Sunday Mail* summarised British newspaper reports of the book as ‘ill-considered and dangerous’.⁶² Japanese reaction was equally swift. Reported in the London *Times* and repeated in the Australian and US press, the book was condemned in the Japanese House of Peers by the Foreign Minister, Hachiro Arita. Baron Yoshiro Sakatani said the book had wrecked relations between Japan and Australia.⁶³ Although a speculative work, *Japan Must Fight Britain* highlighted the expansionist views of Japanese militarists and reinforced the continuing concerns of Australian military planners.

Not all criticism of Australian defence policy was based on invasion. Captain Selwyn Day’s 1934 publication, *Australia’s Imminent Peril*, attempted to arouse Australians to query their defence policy. Exposing the country’s weakness in naval and military defence, Day—a retired British Navy reservist—argued that ‘supreme complacency is Australia’s peculiarity’.⁶⁴ With valuable resources, Australia was ‘the world’s richest and easiest prize’ that required a suitable navy for protection. Every important nation, Day argued, had a merchant marine for both economic reasons and as part of naval defence. The development of modern warfighting meant Britain may not be able to assist Australia at time of war. To offset this predicament Day recommended that Australia should provide its own naval defence, initially through a fleet of submarines, a well-funded merchant fleet and training institutions for boys to supply sailors. While promoting naval forces Day’s work contributed to the increasing body of literature that discussed the poor state of Australian defences. Day’s treatise attracted widespread attention in newspapers. Reviewed in the Brisbane *Courier Mail*, *Australia’s Imminent Peril* was considered as ‘not pleasant reading for Australians, but it is one that commands attention’.⁶⁵ The Sydney *Daily Telegraph* queried Day’s ‘political and economic views’, but the ‘recommendations in this vigorously-written little book are irresistible. Australia is undoubtedly running grave risks at present. Every patriotic citizen should make himself acquainted with the data collected by Captain Day’.⁶⁶ ‘All Australians should’, wrote the Sydney Mail reviewer, ‘and those interested in the defence problems of their country must read *Australia’s Imminent Peril*’.⁶⁷ Day’s work was representative of other publications that began to appear at this time which influenced public opinion and contributed to the debate on Australian defence policy.

59 ‘Japan to Invade Australia’, *Scrutineer and Berrima District Press*, 5 February 1936, p. 3.

60 ‘Sees War! Australia and New Zealand as Prizes’ *Carcoar Chronicle*, 28 February 1936, p. 1.

61 ‘Britain and Japan A Conflict Prophesied’, *Carnarvon Northern Times*, 5 February 1936, p. 3.

62 ‘Menace of Japan?’ Brisbane *Sunday Mail*, 9 February 1936, p. 7.

63 ‘Japan’s Foreign Minister Condemns Warlike Book’, *The New York Times*, 12 May 1936, p. 1.

64 Selwyn Day, *Australia’s Imminent Peril*, New Century Press: Sydney, (1934), p. 8.

65 ‘General Literature’, Brisbane *Courier Mail*, 20 October 1934, p. 20.

66 ‘Backbone of a Navy’, Sydney *Daily Telegraph*, 24 November 1934, p. 4.

67 ‘Some Australasian Matters’, Sydney *Mail*, 3 October 1934, p. 16.

Not all publications, though, were harbingers of doom. Veteran journalist Malcolm Ellis brought a more balanced view to the debate with the publication of *The Defence of Australia* (1933). According to the Melbourne *Herald* review, *The Defence of Australia* ‘examines a controversial subject with impartial eyes’. Ellis’s examination ‘deserves our thanks for having lifted the subject out of the political arena into the realms of common sense’.⁶⁸ Ellis countered the increasing anti-Japanese sentiment by pointing out that Japan did not have the naval or military capability to invade Australia. Recognising the vastness of the country, he wrote that it would be a miracle if any substantial invading force—having passed British, French and US territories—could arrive in a place where it could impact events. Ellis concluded by highlighting the role populist politics had on defence.⁶⁹ The *Bulletin* told its readers that the book ‘should be in the library of every Australian and in the library of every limelight-chasing swashbuckler and irresponsible editor’.⁷⁰ While partisan, as an employee of the *Bulletin*, the idea of temperance in the debate was valuable.

Continued Japanese militarism and the population losses from the First World War were reflected in a resumption of invasion-scare literature in the 1930s. In AL Pullar’s novel *Celestalia: A Fantasy AD 1975* (1933) a series of volcanic disasters in Japan during 1938 force the population to flee to the Japanese colony in China, Manchukuo. Once the colony can no longer provide for the population the Japanese displace the Chinese, forcing them south to Sumatra and west to Mongolia. Following a European conflict in 1952, impoverished Italians emigrate in large numbers to Eastern Australia. Simultaneously a race war erupts in the US that sees white Americans fleeing to Canada. The defenceless Australia is invaded by the southward moving Chinese and renamed ‘Celestalia’, the remnants of the Australian government survive in Tasmania.⁷¹ Pullar’s work admonishes the Australian population for spending too much time on sport rather than the importance of defence and planning. Similarly, Mitchell’s *Awakening*, published four years later, opens with the outbreak of war with Australia ‘caught unprepared’.⁷² The invader lands in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, destroying the cities and slaughtering combatants and civilians. A doughty veteran of the First World War, with leadership and organisational skills, forms a commando in Queensland that successfully rescues Rockhampton from calamity. The band of fighters, that include women, are a motley assortment of people. The novel has familiar tropes of anti-capitalism, unionism and pacifism and concludes with the cessation of Australia as a nation. Writing in the foreword, former prime minister WM Hughes, states that the novel is ‘a clarion call for an effective defence programme, and emphasises

68 ‘Recent Books Reviewed’, Melbourne *Herald*, 23 November 1933, p. 39.

69 MH Ellis, *The Defence of Australia*, Endeavour Press: Sydney, (1933), p. 69.

70 ‘Red Page’, *The Bulletin*, 9 November 1933, p. 5.

71 AL Pullar, *Celestalia: A Fantasy, 1975 AD*, Canberra Press: Sydney, (1933).

72 AD Mitchell, *Awakening*, Angus & Robertson: Sydney, (1937), p. 2.

that defence against aggression is not only compatible with pacifism, but is essential to the existence of civilised people'.⁷³ The *Sydney Morning Herald* told its readers Awakening was 'a warning to all classes of the community of the horrors which would accompany an invasion of Australia' and for that 'Ex-servicemen and those interested in the future of Australia will hail it with delight'. It concludes by asking 'Will Australians heed the warning?'.⁷⁴ For the Brisbane *Telegraph* reviewer, *Awakening* was 'a story clearly intended to impress Australians with the grim consequences which could attend an invasion in an hour of unpreparedness'.⁷⁵ The Grafton *Daily Examiner* was more strident, writing that Mitchell had 'depicted, with vision and knowledge, what, in all probability, would happen if a great power driven by national and economic need, made an attempt to seize this rich island continent'.⁷⁶ As the world's rearmament programs increased, so too the concern over defence preparedness in Australia.

Invasion anxiety writing was not limited to fictional accounts. Publications such as *The Lone Hand*—established in 1907 as a sister publication to the *Bulletin* and modelled on the London *Strand* magazine—included articles on defence and invasion. An early article, 'The Pacific: A Japanese Pond', published anonymously in the December 1910 issue, decried the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the naval situation in the Pacific. According to the article, the 'centre of the world has shifted' to the Pacific, which 'has become, whether we want it or not our back-yard' and 'is the destined theatre of the naval conflicts of the future'. In the racist tones of the time, the author concluded by stating that

We, this handful of white men, are looked to by the white races of the north and north-east to do our duty in the coming conflict. The loss of the Australian coastline would be disastrous to every other white Power in the Pacific; the holding of it by ourselves, by adequate defence, would be incalculable value to the preservation of a White Pacific.⁷⁷

Lieutenant George Taylor, of the Australian Intelligence Corps, wrote a series of articles on aerial defence beginning in the January 1911 edition. Taylor, a keen inventor who worked in machine flight and wireless, promoted new technology to defend Australia and authored fiction that used technology that saved the country from Germany and Japan.⁷⁸ 'Wanted at Once! Aerial Defence from Aerial Invasion'

73 Mitchell, *Awakening*, p. v.

74 'The Awakening', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 August 1937, p. 16.

75 'The Awakening', Brisbane *Telegraph*, 28 September 1937, p. 16.

76 'The Awakening', Grafton *Daily Examiner*, 20 August 1937, p. 10.

77 'The Pacific: A Japanese Pond', *The Lone Hand*, 1 December 1910, p. 161.

78 Michael Roe, 'Taylor, George Augustine (1872-1928)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, (1990), <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/taylor-george-augustine-8756>. Accessed 11 October 2020.

(1911) was the final of his *Lone Hand* articles on air warfare in which he argued for the creation of an Australian air force. In what was a recurring theme for professional officers but not politicians after the First World War, Taylor wrote that without proper training and discipline Australian volunteers in a time of crisis were little more than a rabble. Taylor's envisioned apocalypse was from the air, 'as sure as tomorrow's sun, unless Australia is prepared to meet Aerial invasion with Aerial Defence'.⁷⁹ In the same edition appeared 'The Command of the Air: The story how an Australian aeroplane met the Japanese in the new warfare'. Written by Lawrence Zeal it was a fictional account of the value of aircraft against a Japanese invasion of the northern Australia.⁸⁰ In his May 1911 article, Richard Arthur, member of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, argued that Australia was desirable to Japan. As that was the case, then 'Japan, therefore, is the enemy. If Japan is not the enemy, then there is no enemy'.⁸¹ A moral purist who opposed the South African War, Arthur claimed the credit for the idea of inviting the US fleet to Australia in 1908. An advocate of immigration, he argued for greater defence forces.⁸²

The March 1913 edition of *Lone Hand* was dedicated specifically to military matters. The editorial, entitled 'The Little Brown Cloud on the Horizon', reinforced the publication's advocacy 'of the necessity for a comprehensive and efficient scheme of defence'. The protection of the British Empire had 'created an illusion of

security which is about the worst kind of fool's paradise that a nation can live in'. Not doubting the willingness of Australia's citizenry to defend the country, the editorial queried their efficacy. While the 'average bushman who is accustomed to the horse and the gun, and is able to stand a considerable physical strain, can be turned into a first-class fighting man at short notice, as was proved in South Africa', the 'larger part of our meagre population consists of residents of cities and towns'. These men, with 'little or no experience with firearms or horses ... would be almost useless, even in guerrilla warfare'. Endorsing compulsory training, the editorial urged for further, universal, training of all men as 'a duty not only to themselves, but to our race, to keep this continent free from alien invasion'. Concluding, the editorial stated that by 'emphasising the subject of defence ... electors should see



79 George Taylor, 'Wanted at Once! Aerial Defence from Aerial Invasion', *The Lone Hand*, 1 March 1911, p. 401.

80 Lawrence Zeal, 'The Command of the Air: The story how an Australian aeroplane met the Japanese in the new warfare', *The Lone Hand*, 1 March 1911, pp. 404-411.

81 Richard Arthur, 'The Sham of Our Defence', *The Lone Hand*, 1 May 1911, p. 2.

82 Michael Roe, 'Arthur, Richard (1865-1932)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, (1979), <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/arthur-richard-5061/text8437>. Accessed 16 September 2020.

that national security is a matter of immediate urgency ... Australia is worth the price of a few drinks per man and the time given up to sport'.⁸³ The edition included 'Australian Defence' by 'War Kite', which warned of the inadequacy of Australian naval defence, and articles on the militia, the Small Arms Factory at Lithgow, Light Horse regiments, the military college at Duntroon, as well as works of verse and fiction. While a showcase of Australia's fledgling post-federation military forces, the issue also highlighted the need for greater preparedness to protect the country from invasion, particularly from Japan. The focus of invasion anxiety had shifted to Japan, despite the alliance with Britain, and was to remain so for decades to come. Postwar publications continued to perceive danger of invasion. The September 1919 issue of *Lone Hand* included the article 'The Problem of the Pacific: Australia's Entry into International Affairs'. Endorsing the attitude of former prime minister WM 'Billy' Hughes, which queried Japanese intentions in the Pacific, the article quoted extensively from Fletcher and Hughes. The allocation of the Marshall and Caroline island groups to Japan as mandated territory after the war, according to the author, 'enormously aids Japan, but must as positively weaken Australia'.⁸⁴ The fear of Japan's future intentions in the region were elaborated further in the February 1920 edition's article: 'Japan and the Northern Territory: Is White Australia in Danger?' Despite Japanese reassurances otherwise, the article argued that 'Australia will probably find that the day is not very far distant when she will have to put all her fighting powers into operation to resist invasion'.⁸⁵ These beliefs were endorsed and expanded by the *Lone Hand's* sister publication, *The Bulletin*, which stoked public concern over defence preparedness and invasion fear.

Invasion anxiety increased in prominence in the popular press during the 1930s. The leading voice telling the public of Australia's defence situation was *The Bulletin*. Following the federal government's defence cuts in November 1929, the *Bulletin* editorial decried the government's belief that future war would be fought predominantly in the air. Every major country, such as France, Russia and Japan, had a large standing army, it argued, and the terms of the Locarno Pact meant that 'in the event of another European war, the Commonwealth would have to shift for itself'. 'No Air Force', it continued, 'could save it'.⁸⁶ During the ongoing Five-Power Naval Conference in February 1930, the *Bulletin* editorial noted that with diminishing British sea power 'the Australian Government has skittled compulsory training'. Australia's 'race-exclusion policy which is supposed to be backed by force', had an army of half the number in the previous year, it concluded.⁸⁷ Entitled 'The

83 'The Little Brown Cloud on the Horizon', *The Lone Hand*, 1 March 1911, pp. 362-365.

84 'The Problem of the Pacific: Australia's Entry into International Affairs', *The Lone Hand*, 16 September 1919, pp. 5-10.

85 'Japan and the Northern Territory: Is White Australia in Danger?', *The Lone Hand*, 14 February 1920, p. 3.

86 'Wide Open to Invasion', *The Bulletin*, 6 November 1929, p. 8.

87 'Labor and Defence', *The Bulletin*, 12 February 1930, p. 8.

Defence of Australia', the 22 February 1933 editorial took the form of a fictional account of what could happen if relations between Australia and Japan soured. Events would be triggered by the continuance of the White Australia policy that excluded Japanese immigrants. An invaded Australia would offer little resistance and, following a League of Nations inspection and report, which would be rejected by the Japanese, the country would be occupied, 'except for a small area round Alice Springs' and the 'affair would cease to be front-page stuff'.⁸⁸ Pointing out to its readers that despite 'an almost continual series of disarmament palavers since 1919 the world is spending at least twice as much on warlike preparations as it spent in 1914'. The needs of local defence had belatedly 'flitted across the minds of the rulers of the Commonwealth'. Noting that it was while Hughes was in government that defence expenditure was slashed and compulsory military training abandoned, the state of the Australian defence forces was parlous. The announcement of replacement guns for fortress defences at Sydney, Newcastle and Fremantle, tripling their range, was greeted with concern by the editorial's author. The small-bore guns were tiny compared to those installed by the US to defend the Panama Canal. As for the 'mild little proposal to give members of our tiny "cadre" of officers a bit of training in India' and 'a sort of promise of one or two anti-aircraft guns' was 'only playing at national defence'.⁸⁹ As the decade progressed public awareness of defence arrangements increased, supporting the requests for improvement.

As international tensions rose, the press increased its focus on defence preparedness. Entitled 'The War-Haters', the January 1935 *Bulletin* editorial outlined international tensions and the plight of Australian defence. A 'clerical secretary draws a salary larger than that of the major-general' while the prime minister, Joseph Lyons hates war 'so deeply that he cannot bring himself to take much interest in it or in the horrible business of preparations for it'. Those in 'the costly halls of

Canberra' debate 'flour-taxes or bananas' rather than defence matters'. The 'next war's weapons will be aeroplanes and gas', all 'nationals will be belligerents, especially the people who live in cities and make the munitions'. We need be under no delusion that our distance from Europe and Asia will be any protection. No longer can Australia 'look to Britain to hold the seas between or to protect us while we enlist, train and equip a sufficient army and air force. We are practically unarmed'. Offering a solution, the editorial concluded that Australia must increase its air force and 'establish a flotilla of pocket submarines'.⁹⁰ Using the numbers of Justices of the Peace as an example, the *Bulletin's* 8 May 1935 editorial cited an article from the Adelaide Chamber

THE WAR-HATERS.

REAR-ADMIRAL FORD recently told us that Australia is in danger owing to its lack of effective defence. Other people whose job it is to understand such matters have told us the same. The cables tell us almost every day how the world overseas is turning itself into vast armed camps. The Saar plebiscite may create a dangerous situation. Japan has intimated that it will fight if its intentions on China are interfered with.

Certainly, we have a Defence Department—one whose clerical secretary draws a salary larger than that of the major-general who attends to the military part of it. Under the secretary is a strong body of clerks, entrenched in positions which give a leading aircraftsman or a seaman gunner cause for envy. We have in Mr. Lyons a Prime Minister who hates war. He hates it so deeply that he cannot bring himself to take much interest in it or in the horrible business of preparations for it. He is not alone

88 'The Defence of Australia', *The Bulletin*, 22 February 1933, p. 9.

89 'Defence in Homoeopathic Doses', *The Bulletin*, 16 August 1933, p. 8.

90 'The War-Haters', *The Bulletin*, 2 January 1935, p. 8.

of Commerce's periodical which stated there were more JPs than soldiers in the state. While the JP may have 'a nobler work of man than a warrior, and may typify a higher civilisation, he is usually too old to defend' the country.⁹¹ Highlighting the low numbers of soldiers in training – less than at Federation – the editorial queried the speed with which the defence estimates were put through parliament. Using the current war in the Gran Chaco between Bolivia and Paraguay as an example of the impact of new technology on warfare, the editorial concluded by demanding the Commonwealth 'possess modern arms ... and sufficient highly-trained men to instruct the citizen soldiers in the use of them'.⁹² By this time the international situation had altered dramatically and, as countries began to rearm, calls to ensure Australia was prepared increased.

Criticism of defence preparedness increased as the interwar period continued. Under the headline 'Sanity in Defence', the Melbourne *Age* editorial of 2 October 1933 highlighted the need for increased defence measures. 'There are increasing and welcome signs', it began, 'that throughout Australia the inadequacy of national defence is being vividly realised'. Without laying blame on any political party, the editorial argued that those who criticised the lack of defence preparedness were being proved accurate, though urged against 'raising unwarranted alarms'. However, an improved recognition of the Services by the public was recommended.⁹³ In June 1934 Adelaide's *Advertiser* was scathing in its criticism of 'our very inadequate system of national defence'.⁹⁴ In Melbourne, the *Herald* was equally harsh, building on a series of articles that disclosed weaknesses in defence, calling the country's present defences in 'a position of almost helplessness'.⁹⁵ Noting the increasing international rearmament programs, the Melbourne *Age* editorial of 2 August 1934 argued for local shipbuilding of naval vessels. Although the total cost would be more, savings would be made on exchange and unemployed Australians would find work. Taking a nativist viewpoint, the editorial concluded by demanding the government 'refrain from adopting an attitude of dependence on external sources and from circulating unfounded suggestion as to Australia's technical incompetence to equip herself for her own defence'.⁹⁶ The following month, Brisbane's *Courier Mail* editorialised on Australia's defence obligations. While praising the Lyon government's defence expenditure, they were 'no more than the minimum of security'. 'There has been nothing provocative or alarming in the measures', it argued, 'for rehabilitating our defence forces'.⁹⁷ The *Sydney Morning Herald* argued that although defence was 'now clearly inadequate' it was not a time to attribute blame. Australian isolation

91 Quoted in 'More Jay Peas Than Soldiers', *The Bulletin*, 8 May 1935, p. 8.

92 'More Jay Peas Than Soldiers', *The Bulletin*, 8 May 1935, p. 8.

93 'Sanity in Defence', Melbourne *Age*, 2 October 1933, p. 8.

94 'Defence', Adelaide *Advertiser*, 26 June 1934, p. 8.

95 'Defence Plans and Planners', Melbourne *Herald*, 22 June 1934, p. 6.

96 'Australia's Competence For Defence', Melbourne *Age*, 2 August 1934, p. 8.

97 'Australia's Defence Obligations', Brisbane *Courier Mail*, 13 September 1934, p. 12.

'has been destroyed by the awakening of Asia' and the relative decline of British naval power has 'diminished our security'. While the defence budget had increased 'the most important' gap to be filled was the citizen army. 'If it fails', the editorial concluded, 'the alternatives must be considered'.⁹⁸

In an effort to raise public awareness and knowledge newspapers reported on defence matters. Melbourne's *Age*, for example, published a series of in-depth articles on Australian defence in 1936. The first article, 'Survey of World Position: How it Affects Australia', provided readers with an overview of the international situation. For Australians the situation appeared disadvantageous. Recently industrialised Japan was expanding its sphere of influence as British power weakened while responsibilities increased. Reliance on British naval power jeopardised Australian security.⁹⁹ The second article, 'Factors Affecting Local Decisions', discussed Australian imperial obligations and local defence requirements with the need for expanded facilities to improve defence capacity.¹⁰⁰ The third article discussed the army, its evolution as a militia force and options open to the government to improve defence readiness. Three options were presented: the reintroduction of compulsory training, making the present militia system more attractive, and establishing a small permanent army.¹⁰¹ The fourth and fifth articles discussed coastal defence and the navy and air force and their respective roles. The final article, 'A Suggested Practicable Plan', called for the creation of a small permanent, mechanised army with continued militia training. A permanent air force, the encouragement of private interests in aviation and the establishment of aerodromes and depots, and an aircraft manufacturing industry. The navy would continue to conduct patrolling activities, but without any increase in capital ships, and purchase of modern submarines. A system of interchange of senior officers with Imperial services was also proposed. The author concluded by suggesting that the plan 'would provide Australia with the maximum amount of defence that she is able at the present time to maintain'.¹⁰²

The government announcement of improvements to the defence forces drew mixed reactions from the press. In a June 1936 editorial, *The Sydney Morning Herald* said the 'Government is alive to its responsibilities'. However, the public should not reach 'a wrong impression that our defence is in a satisfactory condition'. Noting Hector Bywater's book, Britain's ability to protect Australia was diminishing due to commitments elsewhere. Like others, this editorial called for universal training to prevent the 'deterioration in physique which is a general feature of modern industrialised peoples, and improving the sense of corporate citizenship'.¹⁰³

98 'Defence', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 September 1934, p. 10.

99 'Australian Defence', *Melbourne Age*, 18 March 1936, p. 11.

100 'Australian Defence', *Melbourne Age*, 19 March 1936, p. 8.

101 'Australian Defence', *Melbourne Age*, 20 March 1936, p. 12.

102 'Australian Defence', *Melbourne Age*, 24 March 1936, p. 11.

103 'Defence Programmes', *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 June 1936, p. 14.

Melbourne's *Argus* in July 1936 praised Sir Archdale Parkhill's announcement for new defence plans.¹⁰⁴ The *Age* likewise stated that defence improvements should 'merit unstinted public approval and active co-operation to ensure their success'.¹⁰⁵ With its typical acerbic wit, the *Bulletin* editorial of 22 July 1936, 'Defence – Or What?', criticised the new Minister for Defence, Robert Parkhill's pronouncements on army strengths. The army 'of 27,000 in a country with a population of nearly 7,000,000 would be laughable were we not citizens of that country'. While Australia had the benefit of distance, the next call to war would 'be more a urgent one than the last, and that less time will be granted for preparation'. Compulsory training, 'suspended, not repealed, by the Scullin Government', needed to be reintroduced, continued the editorial. It suggested a scheme that made all men over 18 years old eligible for home defence with a six months' continuous training followed by a fortnight per annum until the age of 26. Not only would a large reserve of trained men be established, but 30,000 men would be removed from the labour market, reducing unemployment relief. If the government was 'sincere in its efforts to provide for the defence of the country, and not content merely to shelter behind Britain's skirts, it must consider restoring compulsory service'.¹⁰⁶ The Melbourne *Age's* editorial on the same day congratulated the government's efforts to strengthen local defences, particularly the addition of an extra 8,000 soldiers to bring the militia to its peace-time minimum. However, the editorial noted that while in an emergency the 'youth and manhood of this country would respond with alacrity', to 'wait for the emergency might be inviting disaster'. Self-reliance, as defined at the 1923 Imperial Conference, had fallen 'short of standards competently adjudged to be essential, and there is an increasingly urgent need to repair the deficiencies'.¹⁰⁷ While the government's announcement to improve the numbers in the militia by increasing pay rates and funding was widely applauded, there was no guarantee that volunteers would be forthcoming. Periodicals, particularly widely distributed titles like *The Bulletin* and *The Lone Hand*, proved to be platforms for dissemination of defence matters to a wide audience. As the financial constrictions of the Depression passed and international events highlighted the fragility of peace, the broader news-reading public became increasingly aware of Australian defence policy and the needs for improvement.

A STRONGER DEFENCE FORCE.

Measures under way to strengthen Australia's home defences merit unstinted public approval and active co-operation to ensure their success. The Minister for Defence has appealed for another 8000 men to bring the militia to the minimum provision necessary for peace-time training and expansion in war. A campaign for recruits has already brought an encouraging response, and the effort is wisely accompanied by more liberal conditions of pay, which in many instances is doubled, provision of fares, brighter uniforms, and efforts to make the training more attractive in various ways. Since a former Government

104 'Defence and Dallying', Melbourne *Argus*, 21 July 1936, p. 8.

105 'A Stronger Defence Force', Melbourne *Age*, 22 July 1936, p. 10.


106 'Defence – Or What?', *The Bulletin*, 22 July 1936, p. 8.

107 'A Stronger Defence Force', Melbourne *Age*, 22 July 1936, p. 10.

Conclusion

The interwar period was one of profound change in Australia. The First World War left damaged lives and families, along with an enormous federal debt. A growth period saw an increase in secondary industry, employment and wages until the Depression. As governments grappled with the financial distress caused by the severe economic downturn, expenditure deemed as non-essential, such as on defence, was slashed. Despite attempts by members of the League of Nations to promote disarmament, by the mid-1930s most countries had embarked on a re-armament program. International events impacted on government decision-making in Australia as did public opinion. Newspaper and periodical articles and editorials highlighted the state of local defence which had seen drastic reductions in funding. As the likelihood of conflict increased, so too the demands for action by editorials, with publications such as the *Bulletin* and *The Lone Hand* contributing greatly. But the influence of public opinion about defence preparedness was not limited to the populist press. Works of speculative fiction in the future war genre, beginning in Britain with *The Battle of Dorking*, played on readers' anxiety over safety. Contemporary commentators contributed to a body of literature that placed Japan central in any future conflict in the Pacific and, thereby, imperilled Australia. This growing body of writing, increasing as the decade of the 1930s progressed, heightened public awareness that informed Australian defence policy.

Image 1: A Supermarine Walrus amphibian aircraft A2-1 being hoisted onto HMAS *Australia*, 1935.
Source: AWM P02935.005.



The RAAF and the Revolver Cannon

Kevin Driscoll¹

After several years of World War II both the German *Luftwaffe* and Allied air forces recognised the need for aircraft guns and cannon to swiftly deliver accurate fire if an enemy aircraft was to be disabled or destroyed during aerial conflict. This requirement translated to a high rate of fire, a short projectile flight time and projectiles having sufficient kinetic or explosive energy to disable or severely damage an aircraft on impact.

The Germans addressed this need by specifying a requirement during 1942 for what was to become known as the ‘million-point’ gun. A weapon that could deliver a cyclic rate of fire of at least 1000 rounds per minute with a muzzle velocity of 1000 metres per second.² The kinetic, or explosive, energy came from the fact that only cannon calibre projectiles could achieve velocities approaching 1000 metres per second and carry sufficient explosive to achieve the desired result. Numerous German companies experimented with, and developed, 20 mm aircraft cannon, all of which were of the traditional linear design. The problems to be overcome in a linear action cannon included the speed of operation of the weapon, the feed of ammunition and the disposal of fired cartridge cases and used links. All of these problems had to be overcome if the ‘million-point’ objective was to be achieved.

Krieghoff Waffenfabrik was one such German company developing a 20 mm aircraft cannon. Ludwig Krieghoff first established an arms company in the city of Suhl during 1886 to manufacture sporting weapons, such as rifles and shotguns. Krieghoff had a son Heinrich, who had worked in Belgium at Fabrique Nationale and also at Sheffield in the United Kingdom (UK). After returning from the UK Heinrich served in the German Army before establishing his own arms company in 1916, Heinrich Krieghoff Waffenfabrik. Heinrich Krieghoff Waffenfabrik manufactured parts for Mauser and developed a reputation for quality work. During the depression in the early 1920s Ludwig Krieghoff ceased operation and the assets of the company were transferred to Heinrich Krieghoff Waffenfabrik. The Krieghoff business survived the depression, and in 1930 received an order for 10,000 Parabellum P08 pistols from the Luftwaffe. Heinrich Krieghoff Waffenfabrik

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2 George M Chinn, *The Machine Gun*, (Volume III, Parts VIII and IX), Bureau of Ordnance: Washington, DC, (1951), p. 44.

3 George M Chinn, *The Machine Gun*, (Volume I), Bureau of Ordnance: Washington, DC, (1951), p. 489.

won more work, primarily from the Luftwaffe, manufacturing and repairing aircraft weapons. Notably, Krieghoff designed and produced the FG 42 rifle, a specialist weapon used by Luftwaffe paratroopers.³

Simultaneously Krieghoff developed the MG 301, a linear action 20 mm aircraft cannon.⁴ Progress was slow and in late 1941 the Director General of Equipment for the Luftwaffe, Colonel-General Ernst Udet advised Krieghoff the project was to be terminated and all development work transferred to Mauser. The reason being, Udet did not believe Krieghoff had the necessary facilities and expertise to bring the project to a satisfactory conclusion. On 17 November 1941 Udet committed suicide which delayed the transfer of the MG 301 to Mauser until Udet's successor, General Ernhard Milch, early in 1942, confirmed Udet's decision and the project was physically transferred.

Mauser established a design team to further develop the Krieghoff MG 301. The team was led by the technical director of Mauser, Otto von Lossnitzer. Frederick Linder was appointed project manager and two senior engineers, Anton Politzer and Werner Jungmann were appointed to the team. Upon transfer to Mauser, the MG 301 was allotted the Mauser in-house designation Gerät 7-43, however, during the weapon's time with Mauser it was allocated a number of other designations, including G 215, Gerät 6-13, GL-15 as well as 213M MG and MG 213A.

The MG 301 was a linear design cannon, over three metres in length and weighed 52 kg. It was a gas operated weapon that achieved a firing rate of 600-700 rounds per minute with a muzzle velocity of 1000 m/sec. A feature of the weapon which provided some promise of reaching the 1000 rounds per minute goal was the 'hinge' between the gas piston and the moving parts of the weapon's mechanism. The 'hinge' caused the moving parts to move to the rear twice as fast as the gas piston was travelling. The cannon had an integral feed unit, mounted on top of the receiver which accepted ammunition from the right side. The fired cartridge cases were ejected through the bottom of the receiver. The Krieghoff design incorporated a pivoting lock mechanism to lock the breech block at time of firing. The ammunition was electrically initiated. Test weapons were manufactured, but the MG 301 20 mm cannon did not enter operational service.⁵

As well as the MG 213A development, Mauser ran a parallel development project of the original Krieghoff gun and this weapon was also identified by at least two designations, MG 213V and Later MG 213B. As the MG 213A and 213B projects progressed, Mauser was able to lift the rate of fire close to the required 1000 rounds per minute. However, component failures were exceedingly high and Mauser concluded the project would not satisfy the 'million-point' criteria.

4 Anthony G Williams. and Emmanuel Gustin., *Flying Guns of World War II*, Airlife Publishing: Shrewsbury, (2003), p. 26.

5 R. Wallace Clarke, *British Aircraft Armament: RAF Guns and Gunsights from 1914 to the Present Day*, Haynes Publications: Yeovil, (1995), p. 87.

It was a rifle calibre machine gun of Russian design, the ShKAS, with its very high rate of fire—1800 rounds per minute—which provided Politzer with the answer. The ShKAS and its heavy machine gun and cannon developments used a complex rotary feed mechanism which loaded the ammunition in stages. Mauser engineer, Dr. Meir, along with Politzer applied the principles of the rotary feed mechanism of the ShKAS to a totally new design and the result was the gas operated revolver cannon, the MG 213c.⁶ It is believed the first prototype MG 213c was manufactured in early 1944. The gun was under test in a ME 110 aircraft at war's end, but the cannon did not see operational service. The weapon was at times identified as the MG 216 but eventually identified as the MG 213c. The MG 213c was gas operated and fired the electrically initiated 20 x 135 mm B ammunition and satisfied the 'million-point' criteria, firing 1200 plus rounds per minute with a muzzle velocity of 1050 m/sec. The goal had been achieved.




Image 1: Mauser MG 213c. Source: *Flying Guns: The Modern Era*, p. 17.

The German town of Oberndorf and the Mauser complex there, had been subjected to bombing raids throughout the war that increased ahead of advancing Free French Forces. On 16 February 1945 an American day-light raid dropped 35 500 lb bombs on Oberndorf killing 21 people, completely destroying three buildings, severely damaging eight, moderately damaging four and lightly damaging 130. Other raids followed on 9 March, killing two and again on 25 March, killing one. It became evident that Oberndorf would fall to French forces and in early April Hitler ordered the 'relocation of important final military armament production'. Hitler's order required the relocation of machinery to manufacture rifles, plus the relocation of aircraft armament currently being tested and all machinery design drawings. A convoy of trucks was assembled and once loaded headed towards Austria. One truck broke down at Lindau near the shores of Lake Constance and it was later found that this truck was carrying a pre-production MG 213c and other associated equipment. The remainder of the convoy was eventually captured by Allied troops near Innsbruck, Austria.

On the night of 19-20 April 1945, a twenty-nine-car train loaded with machinery, engineering data and 200 engineers and workers from the factory

⁶ Chinn, *The Machine Gun*, (Volume III, Parts VIII and IX), p. 44.

departed Oberndorf for the Ötztal Valley in the Austrian Alps. General Philippe Leclerc's Free French armoured force occupied the town of Oberndorf and the Mauser factory on 20 April 1945. The train was attacked by allied aircraft and sustained some damage before reaching its destination on 30 April 1945. On arrival at Ötztal, the site of the German research wind tunnel, no attempt was made to unload the train or set up any machinery as it was clearly evident the war was about to end.

The Allies formally accepted the unconditional surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945. Later that month British and American intelligence officers of the Combined Intelligence Objective Subcommittee (CIOS) visited the Mauser complex at Oberndorf to question Mauser employees about the activities at the plant, but found vital equipment and records had been transported to Austria. A team of CIOS investigators then moved to the Ötztal Valley and found the Mauser train. With the agreement of the French forces occupying Oberndorf, British weapons technicians visited the Mauser Works and returned to England certain material and drawings relating to the MK 213, 30 mm revolver cannon as well as the MG 213c, 20 mm revolver cannon. By September 1945, a programme of work had been commenced in the UK on ammunition for the 30 mm weapon and by October 1945 a decision had been reached that British development of the Mauser 30 mm revolver cannon would be based on the V6 Type, the sixth prototype weapon designed and manufactured by Mauser.

During 1946 Werner Jungmann, formally a project engineer working on the Mauser MG 213c in Germany, moved to England and bought with him a set of drawings for the current model MK 213 30 mm cannon, a number of which had been produced in Germany before the end of the war. During March 1947 the British Air Staff issued a formal requirement for a 30 mm aircraft cannon based on their appraisal of the 30 mm German MK 213 cartridge and the V6 Type MK 213 cannon. The weapon was expected to deliver a muzzle velocity of 2000 ft/sec (610 m/sec) at a minimum rate of 1100 rounds per minute. An alternative 20 mm barrel and feed system was also specified by the Air Staff for attacks on certain ground targets. The specified muzzle velocity of the proposed 20 mm revolver cannon was 3000 ft/sec (914 m/sec) with a rate of fire in excess of 1000 rounds per minute. During May 1949 the title 'ADEN (Armament Development Enfield) Gun' was bestowed on the weapon and the name applied to both the 20 mm and 30 mm versions of the cannon.⁷

Australia showed interest in the 20 mm ADEN Gun for fitment into future fighter type aircraft of the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Department of Supply and Development Agendum No. 144/1949

7 Anthony G Williams and Emmanuel Gustin, *Flying Guns: The Modern Era*, Crowood Press: Marlborough, (2004), p. 17.

sought a sum of £370,000 be approved for the project.⁸ The Australian government did not proceed with the manufacture of the ADEN gun, though the Lithgow Small Arms Factory did produce ADEN gun spares for a considerable period of time.

By November 1949 the 30 mm ADEN cannon was considered to have too low a velocity and work continued on the 20 mm version while improvements were developed for the 30 mm round to improve muzzle velocity. A programme was underway in the UK to increase the muzzle velocity of the 30 x 86 mm cartridge by increasing the capacity of the cartridge case to accommodate more propellant while maintaining the overall length of the 30 mm ammunition at 199 mm. This required increasing the cartridge case length from 85.8 mm to 111.2 mm an increase of 25.4 mm (one inch) which permitted an increased propellant load of 45 grams. The result was that the muzzle velocity of the round was increased from 1980 ft/sec (603.5 m/sec) to 2560 ft/sec (780 m/sec) with a corresponding increase in range and an improvement in trajectory. From that point, the initial 30 mm cartridge with a cartridge case length of 85.8 mm was referred to as low velocity ammunition and ammunition with a cartridge case length of 111.2 mm referred to as high velocity.




Image 2: Mk 4 ADEN Cannon.
Source: Author.

By July 1952 sufficient progress had been made in developing the high velocity 30 mm cartridge that the viability of the 20/30 mm cartridge was being questioned. The main factor against the 20 mm projectile was the limited explosive content when compared with the 30 mm projectile. The net weight of the 20 mm projectile was a nominal 95 gram as opposed to the 275 gram weight of the high explosive 30 mm projectile. The muzzle velocity of the 30 mm cartridge was deemed acceptable at 2560 ft/sec (780 m/sec). However, work on the 20/30 mm cannon and ammunition lapsed in mid-1952 while development work on the high velocity 30 mm ADEN Cannon and ammunition continued.

8 Defence Committee Agendum No. 143/1950. Aden 20/30 mm Gun: manufacture in Australia, National Archives of Australia (NAA) A5954, 2331/16.

9 'Australia's Sabre Jet Now Flying', *Hobart Mercury*, 4 August 1953, p. 1.

10 'Our First Sabre Tested', *Brisbane Courier Mail*, 14 July 1954, p. 3.

11 RAAF Australian Air Publication. AAP 731.0, Part 1, Section 1F, Instruction 1. Declaration of Obsolescence of Marks 1 and 3 guns, '30 mm ADEN Gun – Technical Details and Introduction', NAA A705, 15/19/68.

On 3 August 1953, Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation CA-26 Sabre prototype made its first flight.⁹ Virtually twelve months later, on 13 July 1954 the first production CA-27 Sabre, A94-901, made its first flight fitted with 30 mm Low Velocity Mk. 1 ADEN Guns.¹⁰ The RAAF introduced the 30 mm ADEN Gun via Armament Instruction No. 1 dated 22 February 1955.¹¹ The instruction advised that four marks of cannon were available, marks 1 through 4, and left-hand and right-hand guns were identified for each mark number. On 8 July 1955, RAAF Overseas Headquarters, London, advised the Secretary of the Department of Air, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, that the Headquarters had been advised by the Ministry of Supply that action had been taken to declare the 30 mm ADEN Guns, marks 1 and 3, obsolescent. At that time, a quantity of 22 Mark 1, 30 mm ADEN Guns were held in Australia and modification kits were ordered to convert the 22 guns to Mk 4 configuration. The CAC Sabre served the RAAF until being progressively replaced by the Mirage III and D models from 1963. A number of RAAF Sabre aircraft with their installed 30 mm ADEN Guns were passed to Malaysia¹² and Indonesia¹³ after RAAF service.



Image 3: 'Four of a Kind' over George Town, Penang, Malaysia. RAAF promotional photograph, c. 1975-1976. Source: Author.

12 Ten Sabres were passed to Malaysia at Butterworth during October 1969. See 'Gift sabres for Malaysia', Bourke *Western Herald*, 10 October 1969, p. 11.

13 The first ten of sixteen ex-RAAF Sabre aircraft departed RAAF Williamstown on the 13 February 1973. See 'Sabres in Indonesia', *RAAF News*, 1 March 1973, p. 3.

The second revolver cannon adopted by the RAAF was the French DEFA 552 cannon, also a development of the original Mauser MG 213c. The French captured the Mauser works at Oberndorf on 3 May 1945 and control of the facility was assumed by Direction des E'tudes et Fabrication d'Armement (DEFA). DEFA was a department of the French Army which broadly translates to Department of Studies and Weapon Manufacturing. Initially the French kept the Mauser Werke intact and supervised the work being conducted at Oberndorf. Mauser were at the time working on the 20 mm MG 213c, the 30 mm MK 213 and also trialled the MG 250. The MG 250 was a variant of the MG 213c chambered for the electrically initiated 20 x 82 mm ammunition of the Mauser MG 151/20 aircraft cannon. During 1947 DEFA commenced moving plant and machinery to Centre d'Etude d'Armement de Mulhouse (CEAM) at Mulhouse, Alsace in France.¹⁴ Anything of value, intellectual or monetary, was removed from Mauser's facility at Oberndorf prior to February 1948 when on the orders of the French commander approximately 60% of Mauser's buildings were demolished. CEAM was established in 1946 as a weapon development centre, however, but did not have manufacturing facilities until 1952 when CEAM took over the former Fabrique d'Objets Méalliques du Haut-Rhin (FOMHAR) metal working company. After acquiring manufacturing capability CEAM was renamed Atelier Mecanique de Mulhouse (AME).

As well as receiving the accumulated technical knowledge of the revolver cannon, the French obtained the services of Anton Politzer. Politzer had been instrumental in the initial development of the MG 213c/MK 213 and is credited with developing the progressive ammunition loading system of the weapon. On his arrival in France, Politzer was appointed head of the medium calibre research group at DEFA. During 1949 the French developed the Mk 255/3CG revolver cannon in 30 x 99 mm B.¹⁵ This was the French consolidation of the work carried out by Mauser and development work conducted in France since war's end. The Mk 255/3CG underwent trials and the results formed the basis for the next development cannon the Mk 255/3CGF. The 30 x 97 mm B calibre Mk 255/3CGF cannon was developed during 1952 and adopted during 1954 as the basis for the DEFA 540 series; the gun was designated the 30M541. Performance wise, the gun was broadly equivalent to the ADEN low velocity cannon being developed in the UK.

Both the British and the French recognised the need for a higher muzzle velocity and the two countries agreed on common cartridge and cartridge case dimensions for the proposed high velocity rounds. The calibre of the high velocity rounds for both the ADEN and DEFA cannon is 30 x 113 mm B and the overall cartridge length is 199 mm.¹⁶ Despite the common dimensions of the cartridge case, and overall length of the round, there was no standardisation on such matters as the

14 Williams and Gustin, *Flying Guns*, p. 19.

15 Williams and Gustin, *Flying Guns*, p. 19.

16 Williams and Gustin, *Flying Guns*, p. 20.

firing voltage or electrical current required for ignition, gas pressure characteristics, or the strength and flexibility of the belt links, so the ammunition is not necessarily interchangeable between the French and British guns. The British continued using a brass cartridge case while the French used a steel cartridge case.

The first of the high velocity DEFA cannon to enter service with the Armée de l'Air Française (French Air Force) was the DEFA 551 installed in the Sud Aviation S.O. 4050 Vautour IIA jet powered bomber, interceptor and attack aircraft. The first flight of the S.O. 4050 occurred on 16 October 1952 and it entered service during 1958. The aircraft was fitted with four 30 mm DEFA 551 cannon with 100 rounds per cannon. A number of these aircraft were operated by Israel, primarily in the attack role with one air-to-air kill accredited to the type. The S.O. Vautour IIA was retired from all military service by 1979.



Image 4: Mirage Gun pack fitted with DEFA Cannon, Fighter World Museum at RAAF Williamtown. Source: Author.

During 1960 the RAAF commenced evaluating potential replacements for the CAC manufactured CA-27 Sabre aircraft then in service as the RAAF's front line fighter. The short listed aircraft were the F-104F Starfighter and the Mirage III. The Mirage was chosen as the aircraft best satisfying the RAAF operational criteria and the aircraft was chosen in March 1961 after an intensive sales effort by the French.¹⁷ Manufacture of the aircraft took place at the Government Aircraft Factory and Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation who were neighbours at Fisherman's Bend, Melbourne. Final assembly and test flight of the aircraft took place at the Government Aircraft factory facility at Avalon, Victoria. The RAAF operated a total of 100 Mirage III single seat aircraft plus 16 Mirage IIID dual seat aircraft. The single seat aircraft were fitted with a Thomson-CSF Cyrano IIB dual mode air/ground radar which facilitated radar assisted weapon delivery, however, the dual seat aircraft were not fitted with radar and therefore stores were

¹⁷ *Aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force*, Big Sky Publishing: Newport, (2021), p. 419.

launched without radar assistance. Both the single and dual aircraft were equipped to carry two 30 mm DEFA cannon fitted to a removeable gun pack positioned in the lower fuselage. The gun pack had capacity for 130 rounds per side and used cartridge cases were ejected directly overboard while used links were returned to a used link compartment in the gun pack.¹⁸ The Mirage served the RAAF until being replaced by the McDonald Douglas F/A-18A/B Hornet commencing in late 1985. A number of ex-RAAF Mirage aircraft were purchased by Pakistan where they were extensively modernised and it is anticipated they shall remain in service post 2020.

A third RAAF aircraft can be fitted with a revolver cannon and that is the BAE Hawk 127 employed by the RAAF primarily in the lead-in fighter training role. The aircraft can be fitted with a centreline gun pod incorporating a 30 mm Mk 4 ADEN cannon with 130 rounds of ammunition. The same canon fitted to the RAAF Sabre.

Conclusion

Spawned by the Germans, nurtured and matured by the British, French, Swiss, Russians and the Americans, the revolver cannon has been in operational service for over 70 years. How much longer the revolver cannon will remain in service is impossible to say. However, the cannon is being continuously upgraded and installed in new airframes and is in service with numerous armed forces world-wide.

The RAAF used the 30 mm ADEN gun in the Australian built Mk 30, 31 and 32 Sabres, moved to the 30 mm DEFA installed in the Mirage IIIIO and D and returned to the 30 mm ADEN for the BAE Hawk.¹⁹ The FA/18 legacy Hornet which forms the diminishing backbone of Australia's current fighter defence as well as the FA/18 Super Hornet, are both armed with versions of the 20 mm M61 rotary cannon.²⁰ The F-35, replacing the legacy Hornets, is also armed with a rotary cannon, the four-barrel 25 mm GAU-22/A with 180 rounds of ammunition.²¹ This leaves the BAE Hawk as the only revolver cannon armed aircraft serving in the RAAF. It is too early to know what will replace the Hawk in the lead-in fighter role, however, for now, the revolver cannon plays its part in teaching gunnery to tomorrow's generation of fast jet pilots, plus the ADEN keeps a twinkle in the eye of a few old Air Force 'Gunnies'.

18 RAAF TG 12-6 Mirage Armament Course Notes. November 1979. Section 4 Gunnery Systems, author's collection.

19 *Aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force*, pp. 382, 423, 521.

20 *Aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force*, p. 501 and p. 564.

21 *Aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force*, p. 541.

'Medics at War'

Understanding the Australian Army Medical Service in the Second World War

Graham McKenzie-Smith¹

Introduction

The Australian Army Medical Corps (AAMC) was tasked to maintain the healthcare of the army in peace and war. As well as manning the many medical units, AAMC staff were also attached to most other units. The AAMC units during the Second World War period are best understood in the context of the Medical Evacuation Chain.

Medical Evacuation Chain

Each battalion or regiment (or equivalent-sized unit) had a Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) attached who operated the Regimental Aid Post (RAP) in peacetime as a type of GP clinic to deal with the everyday healthcare of the unit and medical orderlies were available to accompany detachments. In action the unit's orderlies and stretcher bearers (often the unit band) were to collect casualties from the battlefield and bring them to the RAP for initial treatment.

Each brigade (usually three battalions) had a field ambulance (Fd Amb) attached to it which established dressing stations along the medical evacuation route. They collected casualties from the RAPs and gave them initial treatment, before transporting them further down the chain. Each division (usually three brigades) was allocated a casualty clearing station (CCS) equipped for surgery and further treatment. In the rear areas, general hospitals (Gen Hosp) were established to provide the longer-term treatment and to hold the patients until they recovered. When the patient was ready they would transfer to a convalescent depot (Conv Depot), where they could finish their recovery before being discharged to their unit when fully fit.

Generally, the medical units were flexible in their roles. A field ambulance would usually provide RAP services to units that did not have their own RMO and they could man casualty collection posts which collected casualties directly from

¹ Graham, a member of MHSA in Perth, has been researching the Australian Army in the Second World War for many years and the Army History Unit published *The Unit Guide* in 2018. This article is built around the introductions to the various types of AAMC units that are individually profiled in *The Unit Guide*.

the field or they could man medical staging posts along a difficult evacuation route. With the addition of a surgical team they would act as a CCS and if evacuation was constrained they could act as a hospital to hold patients. Detachments from a field ambulance could also run rest camps which acted as convalescent depots.

As well as the transport section of the field ambulance, other units were involved in patient transport. Detachments from motor ambulance convoys (MACs) manned ambulances attached to CCSs and hospitals in both forward and rear areas, while ambulance car companies (ACCs) worked at the larger base hospitals. Ambulance trains operated in all states and hospital ships returned patients from overseas. As fighting moved through the islands, water ambulance units played a role in forward areas.

Medical Headquarters

The service areas of the Australian Army of 1939 to 1945 were generally headed by the Director (Dxx) at Army Headquarters (AHQ) in Melbourne, assisted by a Deputy Director (DDxx) at each field formation headquarters (Army or Corps) and an Assistant Director (ADxx) at each field division. However, in the case of Medical Services the role at AHQ was filled by the Director General of Medical Services (DGMS), in each senior headquarters was a Director of Medical Services (DMS) and each corps headquarters had a Deputy Director of Medical Services (DDMS). At a divisional headquarters the DGMS was represented by an Assistant Director of Medical Services (ADMS) and where it was necessary to have a medical representative at lower-level headquarters, either a Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (DADMS) would be appointed or the senior commander of the attached medical units would be appointed Senior Medical Officer (SMO). Although these titles refer to the officer holding the appointment, they were also used for the staff and headquarters used to control the AAMC units assigned to his control. At times this HQ unit may have been referred to as HQ AAMC. The DGMS was a major general, the DsMS were brigadiers, the DDsMS were either brigadiers or colonels, the ADsMS were lieutenant colonels and DADsMS usually majors.

In the field army, the ADMS at a DivHQ controlled the field medical units such as Fd Ambs and Fd Hyg Secs and also supervised the RMOs attached to the units in the division. As well as supervising the ADsMS of each division under command, the DDMS at a CorpsHQ also controlled the AAMC units in the corps troops. These included the CCSs (often attached to a division) and some Fd Ambs which worked with the other corps troops, or could be deployed to any area needing extra resources. Other medical headquarters had control of the base medical units such as Gen Hosps and these were designated as DDsMS, ADsMS or DADsMS depending on the size of command, both geographically or in numbers of units.

Field Ambulances

In action the field medics attached to each battalion would gather casualties at the Regimental Aid Post (RAP) and these would be collected and processed by the field ambulance (Fd Amb) attached to their brigade, before being passed along the medical evacuation chain to a casualty clearing station (CCS) or hospital. Although their establishment varied over the war period, the field ambulance had around 12 officers and 250 men (12/250), with HQ Coy having the specialists and administration staff, while A Coy and B Coy could form a Main Dressing Station (MDS) and one or more Advanced Dressing Stations (ADSs) to receive and treat the casualties. Bearer parties could be detached to collect casualties from RAPs in their area, or to man casualty collection posts (CCPs) to supplement the RAPs. Medical Staging Posts (MSPs) and Aerial Evacuation Posts (AEPs) could also be manned along the casualty evacuation chain. When casualties were stabilized the attached

transport section would move them to a CCS or hospital. With the addition of a surgical team the field ambulance could act as a CCS and if the casualty evacuation route was blocked, the dressing stations could act as hospitals by holding patients. An integrated light section (Lt Sec) could be formed by detachments from each company to accompany a detached battalion or as otherwise required by the operational circumstances.

As well as the field ambulances attached to the forward brigades, some were available to be allocated by the CorpsHQ for work in rear areas, including the operation of camp hospitals and rest areas. While in rear areas the divisional field ambulances also provided RAP services to units that did not have their own RMO. Light field ambulances (Lt Fd Amb) were

smaller (9/114) and more mobile to work with armoured and motor brigades and as well as the HQ they had four small sections. Beach companies specialized in the medical needs of an amphibious assault and casualty evacuation from a beach area.




Image 1: Interior of RAP at headquarters Morotai Force, 1945.
Source: AWM I24455.

Casualty Clearing Stations

In action, casualties were collected from the field by parties from the field ambulances and after initial treatment at their dressing stations were transported to a casualty clearing station (CCS) which was equipped to undertake most surgical procedures and to treat the patient before they were transferred to a hospital to recover or for more surgery. Although their establishment varied over the war period, the CCS had around 13 officers and 100 men (13/100). A light section (Lt Sec) could be detached to establish a forward CCS leaving the rest of the unit as the heavy section (Hvy Sec). CCSs were usually allocated with one to each division although others could be inserted into the medical evacuation chain wherever necessary. When the evacuation chain became blocked the CCS could hold patients and act as a hospital. When out of the active areas the CCS acted in a similar role for non-combat casualties.

General and Special Hospitals

After recovery by a field ambulance and treatment by the casualty clearing station, a battle casualty would be transferred to a general hospital (Gen Hosp) for long-term treatment and recovery. Out of action, the general hospitals played the same role as a civilian hospital dealing with servicemen's healthcare needs and training accidents. General hospitals were established in each capital city and as the AIF expanded, others were formed to move overseas to service their needs. Although they varied in size and staff, a 600 bed AIF general hospital would have 21 officers, 149 men and 50 nurses (12/149/50) and be divided into the HQ, a medical division and a surgical division. As well as medical, surgical and anaesthetic specialists, the staff also included specialists in radiology, pathology, etology and ophthalmology. As troop numbers in each area of Australia increased, the general hospitals expanded, or camp hospitals were converted, and as troops moved north to New Guinea the hospital scheme was adjusted to meet needs. Towards the end of the war the capital city general hospitals became permanent military hospitals and after the war they became repatriation hospitals to meet the needs of the veteran community.

Special hospitals (Spec Hosp) had the role to treat soldiers with venereal disease as well as operating the prophylactic centres which were established to minimize the impacts of VD on the fighting strength of the army. Some of the general hospitals developed specialities such as the psychiatric division at 114 Gen Hosp, while an orthopaedic division was part of 103 Gen Hosp. As members of AWAS took over more roles in the army, specialist women's hospitals were formed in Perth, Brisbane and Sydney to meet their needs.

Camp Hospitals

Army units were located throughout Australia with many in permanent camps. Major field units had their own Regimental Aid Post (RAP) and other field units had access to the facilities of their accompanying field ambulances. Permanent camps were initially serviced by Camp Dressing Stations (CDS) manned by staff from field medical units in camp or nearby. These then evolved into Camp Hospitals (Camp Hosp), initially under command of a HQ in each state and later each hospital became a separate unit. They serviced the many base units and permanent camps, with RAPs and short-term hospitalization while longer term patients were transferred into the general hospital system. Composite camp hospitals were those that had several detached sections that provided RAP services to various dispersed locations.

Fortress Companies AAMC

The ports around the Australian coast were defended by pre-war coastal artillery batteries and many of these were in isolated areas away from civilian medical facilities. Frt Coys AAMC were formed to man dressing stations at each site and these were reformed as camp hospitals in late 1942.

Convalescent Depots

After treatment in hospital, soldiers were sent to a convalescent depot (Conv Depot) as the final stage of their recovery and to regain their fitness. These depots were large with up to 2,000 beds and organized with HQ and four companies which specialized in stages of rehabilitation. Patients moved between companies as they recovered until they were able to rejoin their unit in an active role.

Medical Transport Units

Motor ambulance convoys (MAC) were initially AAMC units, with a transport wing attached from the Australian Army Service Corps (AASC). Their role was to transport casualties from the field ambulances to casualty clearing stations and then to the general hospital system. They had a HQ, three ambulance sections (each HQ and three sub-sections) and a workshop section. In January 1943 the MACs were reorganized as AASC units with three platoons (each of three sections) and the platoons were often deployed separately. Some MAC sections or detachments were permanently attached to CCSs or hospitals while others were centrally located and

allocated on a daily task basis. Ambulance car companies (Amb Car Coy) mainly operated in the capital cities on a similar basis to the MACs and most became fully manned by AWASs.

In all states of Australia, railway carriages were converted to carry sitting and lying patients and ambulance train units (Amb Train) were formed to operate them, using civilian engines. As each state had a different railway gauge each train had a limited area of operation. As the fighting moved to the north coast of New Guinea, water transport became more regular with the RAE establishing water transport groups. Many craft were adapted to carry patients and these vessels were concentrated into units known as water ambulance convoys. Medical detachments were formed to treat patients on troopships while specialized hospital ships carried the more seriously injured patients to mainland hospitals.

Field Hygiene Units

At the start of the Second World War the medical units of each division included a field hygiene section (Fd Hyg Sec) to meet the hygiene and sanitation needs of the division. They were intended to have an inspectorial and advisory role but were often diverted to constructional work or disinfecting, as well as instructing other units in this work. The unit structure (of one officer and 28 ORs, including some tradesmen) evolved from the 1914-1918 model and the wide dispersal of the now more mobile division was not served well. In July 1942 the Fd Hyg Secs were disbanded and hygiene became a unit responsibility with senior hygiene officer appointed to each army, corps and division HQ, a hygiene officer to each brigade HQ, a senior hygiene NCO for each unit with a RMO and a hygiene NCO for each other unit. The units became responsible for their own hygiene, with the hygiene staff to advise, supervise and to report compliance through medical channels. A light field hygiene section (Lt Fd Hyg Sec) was smaller and more mobile to accompany the cavalry and armoured divisions.



Image 2: Loading a patient into an ambulance, Oro Bay, 1943. Source: AWM O79528.

Malaria Control Units

From the Syrian campaign, malaria became a significant factor in maintaining the fighting strength of the Australian Army. In the early New Guinea campaigns (especially Milne Bay) malaria caused more casualties than the Japanese and rigorous control measures were put in place. Mosquito breeding grounds were drained or sprayed, and personal protection made mandatory, along with chemical suppression with drugs such as Atebrin. LHQ Sch of Mal Cont was set up to train the specialist units and to spread the word into all units, while LHQ Med Res Unit conducted the experimental work to validate the regimes. Mobile entomological sections (one officer, two ORs) contained a specialist entomologist and a small staff to carry out field investigations of a general or scientific nature, while malaria control units (two officers, 12 ORs) were formed to undertake more local investigations, as well as plan and implement local control measures and train units in their area. The incidence of malaria casualties was significantly reduced by this dedicated effort.

Medical and Veterinary Stores

The AAMC took over medical stores from the ordnance service in September 1939 and initially raised a Depot of Medical and Veterinary Stores (Depot M & V Stores) in each command and military district. With the formation of the AIF they formed the base depot (Base Dep Med Stores) to remain at Melbourne and an advanced depot of medical stores (Adv Dep Med Stores) to move to the Middle East. When this was diverted to the United Kingdom, other units were raised with a confusing lineage, the tracing of which is not assisted by poor record keeping in these small units which concentrated in keeping their stores records intact and correct, while neglecting their domestic records. In Australia and the Pacific, base depots were developed in the areas with a large concentration of troops, for example the Atherton Tableland, Northern Territory and Morotai, while advanced depots were formed for smaller troop concentrations. The New Guinea depot evolved into a base depot as did the NSW depot which also administered other units in transit. The other state depots operated similarly to the advanced depots. The establishment of the depots varied but the base depots had several officers and up to 50 men while the advanced depots had a single officer and two to eight men. Each of the larger depots had a dental stores section while the smaller ones carried dental supplies until late 1942 when these sections became sub-depots of a central depot of dental stores.

Specialist and Other Medical Units

The army general hospitals carried a wide range of specialist facilities, but some separate small specialist units were formed to work with the smaller medical units. Mobile bacteriological laboratories (Mob Bac Lab) were formed (one officer and five ORs) as corps troops and used particularly in areas with a high bacteriological risk. To conduct X-ray screening away from the fixed facilities of the general hospitals, mobile microradiograph units were formed in each state. Surgical teams were routinely formed from the general hospitals and deployed with forward medical units and specialist facio-maxillary plastic surgery units were deployed into general hospitals as required.

Blood product units were formed in each state to tap into the civilian population for blood supplies. A range of optical units were proposed but only a few formed before being absorbed into the general hospitals. An administrative cadre was provided to the Red Cross when they became involved in convalescent homes, and rehabilitation sections were developed in each state. The Psychology Service assisted with recruit training and providing specialist staff to the hospital system.

Nurses, VADs and AAMWS

Nurses from the Aust Army Nursing Service (AANS) were an integral part of the staff in army hospitals and CCSs but there were no specific nursing units. Voluntary Aid Detachments (VADs) were organized by groups such as the Red Cross and St John's Ambulance to assist in army hospitals in Australia. From mid-1940 VADs were employed in the major mainland hospitals and several groups served overseas in Ceylon and the Middle East from September 1941. They came under the direct control of the Army in September 1942 and in December they transferred to the Aust Army Medical Women's Service (AAMWS). Again, no specific units were established and they formed part of the staff at each of the hospital units.

Dental Units

The pre-war militia had no dental units as the Army relied upon civilian practitioners. When the AIF was raised, the Australian Dental Association formed a volunteer dental service which prepared 6 Inf Div for service in the Middle East. As well as the dental sections organic to the general hospitals, convalescent depots, casualty clearing stations and field ambulances, Special Dental Units were formed in the AIF, consisting of a captain dental officer, staff sergeant and corporal dental technicians, a private dental clerk/orderly and a batman. At the time they were the




Image 3: Dental surgery school, Ingleburn, 1943. Source: AWM O69701.

smallest units in the Army and those raised in 1940 were numbered from 1 to 15. From 1941 further AIF units were raised numbered 16 to 68, but now called Dental Units, while militia units were raised which were numbered from 201. Twenty-one of these units served in the Middle East and a further ten with 8 Inf Div in Malaya and elsewhere. Following mobilization in December 1941 many new dental units were formed which accompanied the units that reinforced New Guinea, Queensland, Northern Territory and Western Australia during 1942. In the base areas the dental sections often worked as teams within a larger Dental Centre.

In October 1942 the dental units were reorganized. Eight of the small dental units were consolidated into a single large dental unit, two into HQ sections and six into working sections numbered A to F. Each working section had the same structure as the old small section, and HQ section had two dentists (major and captain), a warrant officer class 2 senior technician, sergeant clerk, two corporal mechanics, two orderlies and two batmen. They could work as two sections or reinforce one of the other sections if needed. For the rest of the war the sections of the dental units tended to work independently in the general area of the HQ section and moved frequently, addressing the dental issues of each unit before moving onto the next one. In April 1943 the separate Australian Army Dental Corps (AADC) was formed.

Little by Little

Little by Little: A Centenary History of the Royal Australian Medical Corps was published by Australian Military History Publications in 2003 and together with the three medical volumes of the Official History gives a more detailed account of the organization and role of the 444 AAMC units which during Second World War maintained the healthcare of the Army.

Banners and Guidon of 10th Light Horse and the Mystery of the South Africa Battle Honour

Peter Shaw¹

The King's Banner for Service in South Africa

In 1903 King Edward VII approved of the presentation of special King's Banners to the various colonial units which were represented in the South African War in recognition of their services to the Empire during that conflict. These were in the form of a plain union flag and were referred to as 'King's Colours' in some of the related Orders.² The initial set of these banners were presented to regiments of the Australian Light Horse, the Royal Australian Artillery and Australian Army Medical Corps at the King's Birthday Parade in Melbourne on 14 November 1904.³ King's Banners for South Africa were subsequently presented to the infantry regiments in 1911.⁴

This banner was received on behalf of 18th Australian Light Horse Regiment (Western Australian Mounted Infantry) at the above parade in 1904 by Major NJ Moore, RSM Bulloch and QM-Sergeant Johnston. It was carried by its successor regiment 25th Light Horse (1912-1918) and by the later 10th Light Horse Regiment. It was laid up by 10th Light Horse Regiment in the Soldiers' Memorial Chapel in St Georges Cathedral at the same time as the presentation of their guidon in March 1928. During my research in the 1970s-1980s I definitely sighted this banner still hanging in the Chapel, but it may well have since disintegrated. The banner pike should still be there bearing an inscribed plate on the lower base – 'Presented by His Most Gracious Majesty the King Emperor to 18th Australian Light Horse Regiment in recognition of services rendered in South Africa'.

1 Peter Shaw is a Fellow of the MHSA.

2 As part of Military Order 123/1908 it also specified that 'Instructions have been received that the Banners presented to the Australian Light Horse Regiments, Royal Australian Artillery, the Victorian Rangers and the Australian Army Medical Corps (GO 258/04) are not King's Colours, but honourable insignia presented by the King as a special mark of favour in recognition of valuable services rendered in South Africa in 1899 to 1902, and that the Honorary Distinctions are not to be borne on these'.

3 General Order 258/1904.

4 The Victorian Rangers had been approved to receive a banner for South Africa in 1905.

Battle Honour for South Africa

Under Military Order 123 of 1908 King Edward VII granted the Honorary Distinction 'South Africa' with years in which units were represented in South Africa to various Australian regiments. The regiments to which the distinction was granted are listed in the schedule within this order. The schedule, grouped by state, shows the present designation of each regiment, designation during the South African War and the Honorary Distinction with year dates granted.

I have sighted a copy of this order and 18th Australian Light Horse Regiment is not listed amongst the Western Australian units in the schedule. Only the three WA infantry regiments existing at that time were included. This must have been an error by the Military Authorities when promulgating this order as the 18th Australian Light Horse Regiment (WAMI) was presented with the King's Banner in recognition of service in South Africa as described above and would have been entitled to the distinction.

All regiments awarded the Battle Honour (referred to as 'Honorary Distinction' in the above Military Order) had this honour recorded under their title in the Australian Army List from 1908 onwards. I have searched various editions of the Australian Army List available in the WA State Library from 1908 onwards through to the mid-1920s and this battle honour does not appear recorded in the List under the successive changes in the regiment's title that occurred over this period - 18th Australian Light Horse Regiment (Western Australian Mounted Infantry) up to 1912, 25th Light Horse (Western Australian Mounted Infantry) 1912-1918, 10th Light Horse 1918-1921 or 10th Light Horse Regiment during early 1920's. The Battle Honour 'South Africa 1900-02' first appears recorded under 10th Light Horse Regiment (West Australian Mounted Infantry) in the 1928 edition of the Australian Army List, although it was not emblazoned on the Guidon presented to the regiment that year (see details under Regimental Guidon in later section).

Regimental Standard, 10th Light Horse Regiment, AIF

This was a purple standard with gold fringe containing as a centre device a black swan on a silver ground within a wreath worked in green and gold, surmounted by a crown. Below the wreath was a scroll inscribed '10 Light Horse'. The colour pike was surmounted by a gold swan. This standard was presented to the regiment by Mrs P Law-Smith on behalf of the Ladies of Rockingham at a ceremony held in Rockingham in January 1915 prior to the regiment's departure overseas. It was consecrated by Bishop Riley.⁵

⁵ Brief details of this and a photo of the ceremony are included in ACN Olden, *Westralian Cavalry in the War-The Story of the Tenth Light Horse Regiment, A.I.F. in the Great War, 1914-1918*, Alexander McCubbin: Melbourne, (1921).

This was subsequently laid up in the Soldiers' Memorial Chapel, St Georges Cathedral in Perth, at the Chapel Dedication Service on 7 October 1923. I sighted this standard in the chapel in the 1970s-1980s but have no record of what subsequently happened to it. I am not sure if it naturally disintegrated with age or was also stolen together with the King's Colour mentioned below.



Image 1: The original guidon in Canberra in 1927 prior to its formal consecration the following year. Note this only shows the ten WW1 battle honours. Source: Jenkins, 'The Regimental Colours of the Colonial Forces and the Australian Army in Western Australia', p. 18.

King's Colour for Service in the Great War

In 1919 His Majesty King George V approved of the presentation of a silk union flag to each infantry battalion of overseas troops which had served abroad during the war of 1914-1918. This was also extended to Light Horse regiments that had served in an infantry role at Gallipoli. These were presented to Western Australian units by the Governor-General Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson at a parade held in

Kings Park, Perth, on 2 October 1920. At this parade were representatives and commanding officers of the former AIF units and the corresponding AMF Citizen Force units. Each colour was initially presented to representatives of the AIF unit and then transferred to the custody of the corresponding AMF Citizen Force unit. The King's Colour presented to 10th Light Horse Regiment, AIF, in recognition of its service was therefore passed on to the Citizen Force unit 10th Light Horse at this parade.⁶ (The designation of the AMF unit was changed to '10th Light Horse Regiment' in 1921 with the secondary territorial title of 'West Australian Mounted Infantry' approved in 1927). This colour was consecrated by Chaplain Colonel Riley, with all other King's Colours that were presented in 1920 to WA units and still carried, at a parade held on the Esplanade, Perth, on 15 November 1924.

This colour was also laid up in the Soldiers' Memorial Chapel in St Georges Cathedral, although the exact date of this is unknown. Again, as part of my research in the 1970s-1980s, I sighted this colour and noted that a 10th Light Horse Regiment Colour patch on a grey surround background (as worn by the regiment after conversion to AIF 1943-1944) had been sewn in the centre, albeit unofficially. I believe this colour was stolen from the chapel by vandals some time during the 1980s, although I have no record of the date of this. I think it was reported in the newspaper at the time, but I did not keep a reference copy.

Regimental Guidon

The initial 10th Light Horse Guidon, now held by the Army Museum of Western Australia, was presented to the militia regiment, 10th Light Horse Regiment (West Australian Mounted Infantry), at a parade on the Esplanade, Perth, on 10 March 1928. The guidon was consecrated by Archbishop Colonel Riley, who was senior chaplain to the WA Forces at the time. According to Alfred Festberg in *Australian Army Guidons and Colours* (1972), this guidon is recorded as having been presented by Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel.⁷ This is also recorded in official information provided by Department of Defence (Army) from their six-monthly return of Guidons, Colours and Banners, possibly a source Festberg may have used.

The Army Museum of Western Australia, as part of an information sheet accompanying the guidon as part of its collection, included reference to Chauvel presenting the guidon as this information was originally compiled from details

6 These King's Colours presented to the Citizen Force infantry battalions had the central circle containing the unit title and the Crown added during the mid-1920s conforming to the normal design for a King's Colour and were formally consecrated and used by these units as their official King's Colour. As light horse regiments did not carry colours but were issued with Regimental Guidons then this King's Colour along with the King's Banner for South Africa were laid up.

7 See AN Festberg, *Australian Army Guidons and Colours*, Allara Publishing: Melbourne, (1972).

provided in Festberg. This information was also included in an online database containing photos and details of selected items from various museum collections. An astute member of the public queried the accuracy of this stating

There is no evidence to support the statement that Sir Harry Chauvel presented the 10th Light Horse Guidon at the parade on the Esplanade on 10th Mar 1928. Sir Harry presented trophies at Broad Meadows in Victoria on 8th Mar 1928, it would not have been possible for him to be in Perth two days later.⁸

I have searched Trove for newspaper articles around 1927-1928. There are articles confirming the guidon being consecrated by Archbishop Riley on 10 March 1928, but there is no specific mention of Chauvel being present or having presented the guidon, which would support the above comment. He is reported as having presented guidons to other regiments in South Australia and Queensland later in March 1928. Chauvel did visit Perth in 1927 and inspected troops—he may have handed over the guidon then or at some time prior to its official consecration. A photo exists that shows the guidon being paraded at the opening ceremony of Parliament in Canberra in 1927, which is the year before it was formally consecrated (see Image 1).⁹




Image 2: Photo of guidon that appeared in *The West Australian*, 5 May 1928, showing the unofficially placed South African Battle Honour scroll at top.

⁸ Author's collection.

⁹ SA Jenkins, 'The Regimental Colours of the Colonial Forces and the Australian Army in Western Australia', unpublished paper, Army Museum of WA Bicentenary Colours Project, (1994), p. 18.

The guidon was carried by the regiment and paraded on ceremonial occasions through to its disbandment in April 1944. There is record of the guidon being laid up in St. George's Cathedral, Perth at a service held Sunday 5 October 1947 with the plan to later transfer it to the Soldiers' Memorial Chapel to join other previous colours of the regiment.¹⁰ This was of course two years prior to the raising of the new regiment in the post-war CMF with the guidon withdrawn from the chapel and passed on to the new unit as outlined below.

In 1949 'A' Squadron, 10th West Australian Mounted Infantry, was formed as a CMF unit within the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, thus preserving the identity of the pre-war militia light horse regiment. On 12 November 1950 at a



Image 3: Only the First World War battle honours shown.
Source: Perth *Sunday Times*, 12 November 1950, p. 5.

ceremonial parade on the Esplanade, Perth, the former guidon of 10th Light Horse Regiment was handed over to this new unit. 10th West Australian Mounted Infantry was raised to a full regiment in 1952¹¹ and redesignated '10th Light Horse' in 1956.

A new guidon was presented to 10th Light Horse CMF by the Governor of Western Australia, Major General Sir Douglas Kendrew at a parade held at the Royal Showgrounds, Claremont, 1 May 1966.

The original guidon was marched off for the last time at the above parade and at a ceremony held at the State War Memorial, Kings Park, on Sunday 10 June 1967. The guidon was laid up in a specially sealed glass display case in the undercroft of the memorial, joining the sets of the colours of the former WA CMF infantry battalions which had been also laid up there in a similar manner in 1964. Under a special Australian government Bicentenary Grant approved in 1987, the guidon and colours, which were deteriorating, were removed for conservation treatment and transfer to the Army Museum of Western Australia for ongoing storage, preservation and display.

¹⁰ 'Regimental Colours', *West Australian*, 4 October 1947, p. 11.

¹¹ AAO 109/1952.

Battle Honours Emblazoned on Regimental Guidon

Militia light horse regiments which continued on the Order of Battle after the First World War were entitled to emblazon on their regimental guidon any battle honour for service in South Africa inherited from their predecessor unit as well as a selection of up to ten battle honours awarded to their AIF counterpart for service during the First World War. The approved positioning of the South African battle honour for emblazoning on the guidon of those light horse regiments who inherited this honour was in the top left-hand corner of the guidon.¹²

As discussed under the details 'Battle Honour for South Africa' in the initial section covering the King's Banner for South Africa, the regiment was entitled to the battle honour 'South Africa 1900-02', but for some unknown reason this was not officially promulgated in the original Military Orders awarding these.

From an early photo taken of a group of 10th Light Horse Regiment members with the guidon, who were part of the Guard of Honour for the opening of Parliament House in Canberra in 1927, the guidon certainly does not include the South African battle honour at that stage. This guidon was formally presented to the regiment the following year.

However, in the *West Australian* newspaper of 5 May 1928 there is a photo published under a heading 'Guidon of "The Tenth"' showing in the top centre of the guidon a scroll for 'South Africa' with incorrect year dates '1901-2' on a plain background immediately beneath this scroll.¹³

This certainly does not appear to be an official addition and is not placed in the approved position for the South African Battle Honour scroll as specified in AAO 112/1927. The only other details published with this photo state: 'On this guidon, the treasured possession of the Tenth Light Horse Regiment, are inscribed the battle honours of this fine fighting force. The present members of the regiment are the heirs of a magnificent military tradition'.

Barry Bamford in his 2011 article, 'The Lives of Riley: A History of the Tenth Light Horse Guidon', also includes a copy of this photo with caption details 'Facsimile of the first Guidon presented to 10LH Saturday 10 March 1928. The representation is taken from a program of events for the day'.¹⁴ As previously mentioned, the Battle Honour 'South Africa 1900-02' did finally appear recorded under 10th Light Horse Regiment in the official Australian Army List publication in 1928, so maybe the above was only a temporary unauthorised fixture to the guidon to enable the battle honour to at least be included in any photo for official publication. The article from *The Daily News* of 9 March 1928, reporting on the

12 As per instructions in AAO 112/1927.

13 'Guidon of "The Tenth"', *West Australian*, 5 May 1928, p. 6.

14 Barry Bamford, 'The Lives of Riley: A History of the Tenth Light Horse Guidon', *Sabretache*, 52, 2, (2011).

proposed presentation and consecration of the guidon on the following day, includes mention of the battle honour ‘South Africa 1900-02’ amongst those to which the regiment is entitled and which are borne on the guidon. Was the above ‘facsimile’ photo created just to ensure there was no embarrassment over the ‘missing’ battle honour?

A later publication ‘Military Tattoo and Speedway Programme’ dated 13 March 1937 also includes this same photo, but other contemporary photos of the guidon taken during the 1930s period which appear in Festberg (1972) and also in another publication ‘10th Australian Light Horse Regt (AIF) Souvenir Scrap Book, 1944’, show the guidon only with the First World War battle honours.

I believe that the official Battle Honour for South Africa was not added until the early 1950s. The photo in the *Sunday Times* article of the guidon ready for the handing over to the newly formed RAAC unit 10th West Australian Mounted Infantry in November 1950 certainly only shows the ten First World War Battle Honours and does not include the above ‘South Africa’ embellishment (see Image 3).¹⁵ The accompanying text within this article would also support this: ‘Guidon carries the battle honors – Anzac, Roumani, Gaza, Beersheba, Jordan (Essalt), Sharon, Sari-Bair, Magdhaba-Rafa, Jerusalem, Megiddo and Damascus’ (sic). No mention is made of the South Africa battle honour.

The fact that the battle honour ‘South Africa 1900-02’ as later officially emblazoned on the guidon is positioned in the bottom centre part of the guidon, under the main central emblem, and is newer looking gold embroidery compared with the other First World War battle honours, would indicate it was a much later addition (see Image 4).

The new guidon, presented in May 1966 as a replacement for the above original one, has the battle honour ‘South Africa 1900-02’ emblazoned in the correct approved position in the top left-hand corner as described previously.



Image 4: Regimental guidon that was laid up at State War memorial in 1967 and now held by the Army Museum of WA. Note the official Battle Honour ‘South Africa 1900-02’ emblazoned on centre at bottom. Source: Author.

¹⁵ ‘Today the 10th Hands Over Its Guidon’, Perth *Sunday Times*, 12 November 1950, p. 5.

From South Coast to South Vietnam: The Men from Merimbula

Rohan Goyne

The southern New South Wales coastal town of Merimbula is located about 50 kilometres from the Victorian border. Like many small communities it was touched by Australia's war in South Vietnam.

The Merimbula Honour Roll of those who served in Vietnam from the district is attached to the cenotaph on the curved blue stone wall which surrounds it (Figure 1).



Image 1: The Merimbula cenotaph together with a 25-pounder from World War 2. Source: Author.

The roll lists three names: Gary Parkes; John Parkes and R.N.Schafer.

A search of the Department of Veterans Affairs Vietnam War Nominal Roll lists the three men from the Merimbula District:

Gary George Parkes A225254 was born in Pambula NSW on 21 September 1951. He served with No 2 Squadron of the Royal Australian Airforce as a Leading Aircraftsman – General Hand from the 8th October 1970 to 30 June 1971 . No 2 Squadron operated GAF Canberra bombers from the Phan Rang Air Base in Ninh Thuan Province from April 1967 to June 1971.

John Phillip Parkes 217028 was born in Bega NSW on 8 April 1949. He was a regular with the Australian Army as a Lance Corporal and he served with 110 Signal Squadron in South Vietnam from November 1968 to April 1970 . 110 Signal Squadron was in Vietnam from 1966 as part of 2 Signals Regiment until the withdrawal. It was based at Vung Tau.

Robert Neville Schafer 2782676 was born in Pambula, NSW, on 21 January 1945. He was a National Serviceman and he served with 3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment from 28 December 1967 to 6 August 1968. This period was the first tour of South Vietnam for 3RAR and the first time National Servicemen served on active duty with the Battalion.

The three men from the Merimbula District who served in the Vietnam War represent a snapshot of Australia's war there: two were members of the then permanent armed services and one was a national serviceman; two served in the Army and one in the Airforce; all were from the ranks; they were aged 19, 19 and 21 respectively. Their vignettes illustrate the rich tapestry of community history yet to be properly told throughout the towns of Australia.




Image 2: Merimbula district roll of honour Vietnam War.
Source: Author.


Reviews

Dasher: The Keven Wheatley VC Story

Michael C Madden

Big Sky Publishing, Newport, 2021

Paperback \$29.99



The author is to be congratulated on producing a detailed and informative story of Keven Wheatley the first Victoria Cross winner of the Vietnam war. The book is divided into 30 chapters and makes compelling reading. The story details the life story of Dasher Keven Wheatley, his earliest years until his enlistment into the Australian Army. I found the text easy to read and informative which in part details the story of the Australian Training Team Vietnam, of which Keven Wheatley was a member. I know that these men were professional and dedicated to their task. This unit was in total awarded four Victoria Crosses, two posthumously.

The book details his postings in Vietnam and highlights the many occasions he went above and beyond what is normally expected of soldiers in combat. Several chapters also detail the life of his family who had to endure many hardships while Keven was away in Vietnam. When Keven was killed in the line of duty the author explains in detail the circumstances surrounding his death and also that of his mate who he tried to save.

The last chapters describe the circumstances of how the family coped after Keven's death and the harassment they endured from protesters and their claims that Keven was a war criminal. A shameful period in the Vietnam war. The Army was no less helpful at this time in that it would not return Keven's body back for burial in Australia. Benevolent Australian citizens clubbed together and raised the necessary money to repatriate him. The last few chapters also lay blame on the politicians and bureaucrats of the day, they should hang their heads in shame for treating servicemen in such a shabby way. The author explains in detail this period in Australia's commitment to the conflict in Vietnam. I felt angry that those early servicemen were dealt a rough hand and only after several newspaper articles appeared illustrating the lack of care the government of the day saw sense.

The word 'bravery' is often used to describe people who have shown duty above and beyond, but Keven and his comrades were truly brave men. Keven's duty to his fellow men is a story for the ages. The adage 'never leave a mate behind' is a worthy saying which most infantrymen adhere to. Keven took this saying to the extreme. The book is well written, informative and thought provoking, and I would recommend it to anyone who is interested in the definition of the word 'bravery'. All in all, a good read.

Michael English

Great Australian Mysteries

Graham Seal

Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2021

Paperback, \$29.99



I read lots of books with similar titles, books that give the reader a thumbnail sketch of historical events that have captured the imagination. So this book covers a lot of what I have already read, lots of events I was alive for and followed at the time and some I have never heard of. It is gratifying to know that before the internet, before electronic communications, there were sailors and settlers with finely tuned superstitions that make the ‘true stories’ that appear on Facebook seem credible.

Graham Seal certainly knows his stuff. He has a healthy skepticism for some of the more fanciful ghost stories, the narrative of which changes depending on the teller. He treats seriously things that deserve respect.

There is a chapter to cover military history, with an overview of the HMAS *Sydney* disaster, and the unaccountable loss of the submarine AE1 in New Guinea and other stories. Each chapter has a list of books consulted, so if your appetite is whetted you know where to look for the bigger picture.

However, the military history section that grabbed my attention was his reference to the assertion that Second World War wrecks are disappearing because they have been furtively harvested for their high quality pre-atomic bomb steel. We had a lady join the SA Branch to investigate this. She had the Bismarck in mind. This is the first time I have heard her theory substantiated.

Our author has a lovely turn of phrase and introduced me to ‘he was admired as a noted liar’ in his chapter on Lasseter. I wonder if our author has seen the famous Eric Joliff cartoon, ‘Lasseter’s last ride’?

Other aspects of serious Australian history are covered, from blackbirding to British using the Tjurutja people as live crash test dummies at Maralinga. And for all my reading of Australian history I never fully appreciated that nobody has found any trace of the entire Leichhardt expedition, no brass buckles, nothing metal, the only objects that would have lasted.

Harold Holt, Juanita Nielson and Min Min lights are mentioned. As everybody has their own opinion on most of these matters and will point out discrepancies, let me say that the ‘horror stretch’ of road between Rockhampton and Mackay got that name years before the murders. It was a horror stretch because it wiped out many a car in the Redex trials. It was simply a bad road. Trust me.

I like books like these because you can read a few pages before you go to sleep, or they can keep you awake with anticipation. Or you can put it in the toilet for short or long stays.

Gail Gunn


The Marine Corps University Press (MCUP) was set up in 2008 to provide, in its own words, ‘an open dialogue between scholars, policy makers, analysts, and military leaders and of crossing civilian-military boundaries to advance knowledge and solve problems’. It calls itself ‘an open access publisher’, meaning that all of its productions are available free and online at <https://www.usmcu.edu/MCUPress>. While there’s a temptation to regard this kind of initiative as a form of propaganda device, established to promote the policies of the United States government’s Department of Defense, it only takes a brief visit to the site to discover a wide range of resources of value to the military historian, both amateur and professional. On request, the MCUP will even post out hard copies of its publications, again completely free of charge. Its only proviso is that such requests should be reasonable in their demands for printed material. Two items which were received in print form are reviewed here to give some idea of the scope and quality of the MCUP’s output.

On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare

Edited by Timothy Heck and B.A. Friedman

Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, 2020

Paperback



On Contested Shores is a collection of 23 self-contained chapters by individual authors, plus editorial material, tracing the history and development of amphibious operations from the 16th to the 21st centuries. It was produced in response to – and as a refutation of – the notion that amphibious warfare is a thing of the past. A key factor in the rise of this notion was that the US Marine Corps’ most recent roles, notably in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, saw it move ever further away from the ‘littoral’ (i.e. shore-based) combat zones it was originally raised to operate in. As a result, say the book’s editors, the USMC had taken on the characteristics and composition ‘of a second land army’. Now, with the general re-emphasis on traditional force roles rather than counterinsurgency, the USMC is seeking a return ‘to its amphibious roots’, where it resumes working in cooperation with the US Navy rather than with the Army. The general momentum of the book, in keeping with the latest USN and USMC doctrine, is aimed at shifting the common perception of amphibious warfare as one of grand, Normandy Landing-style operations, towards smaller, more localised functions, summed up in the concepts of LOCE (littoral operations in a contested environment) and EABO (expeditionary advanced base operations). The book isn’t all acronyms and technowar jargon, however; the general reader will find much of interest in the broad range of examples presented. The account of 47 (Royal Marine) Commando’s assault on Port-en-Bessin on D-Day, 6 June 1944, for example, is a detailed and fascinating analysis of a small unit action in the midst of a major battle,


in the tradition of S.L.A. Marshall. Meanwhile, Antipodean readers will be alarmed to read in the chapter on the attitudes taken by the USMC in selecting material for its study of the Gallipoli campaign, undertaken in its schools during the 1930s, that 'so limited was the scope of Australia's and New Zealand's civilian writers [e.g. Charles Bean], that their accounts were considered untrustworthy'! These and other perspectives posited in *On Contested Shores* provide a useful springboard for analysing and understanding this important aspect of warfare in its past, present and future forms.

A Game of Hare & Hounds: An Operational-level Command Study of the Guilford Courthouse Campaign, 18 January-15 March 1781

Harold Allen Skinner Jr.

Marine Corps University Press, Quantico, 2020.

Paperback



Guilford Courthouse, one of the major Southern Campaign battles of the American Revolutionary War, was fought between Lt Gen Lord Charles Cornwallis with a small force of British, German and Loyalist regulars, against Maj Gen Nathanael Greene with a larger American regular and militia army. It was a tactical British victory, with the crown troops putting in a particularly valiant and professional effort. Ultimately, however, it was a Pyrrhic affair, with Cornwallis, unsupported by local loyalists, having to evacuate the Carolinas and retreat north. Eventually he arrived at Yorktown, the siege of which by Washington and his French allies resulted in Britain finally losing the rebellious American colonies. While there are already a number of very good accounts of the battle and the campaign, *A Game of Hare & Hounds* offers an original approach to understanding the events and personalities involved. The study is framed in terms of a 'staff ride', that is, an actual tour around key sites of the battlefield, where observations are made and questions posed about the conduct of operations and the decisions that generated certain actions and outcomes. As such, the account is broken up into a series of 'stands', accompanied by relevant maps with the necessary directions and orientations, together with exemplars and analyses to guide students through the course of the battle. On the assumption that the students are entering careers in the military, the ultimate aim is that they extrapolate their specific findings into more universal conclusions about the conduct of war and conflict. All of this might seem to render *A Game of Hare & Hounds* a work of very limited appeal to the historian or general reader, but that isn't the case at all. Author Harold Skinner provides much contextual information about both armies, their units, commanders, weapons, tactics and logistics; the course of the campaign and vignettes from the battle, along with maps detailing almost every twist and turn of the action itself; and tables providing orders of battle, strengths, casualties and so

forth, that the book can readily serve as a compendium by almost anyone interested in researching the period or the war. And of course, should the reader eventually visit the site in person, the maps and directions will prove an invaluable resource for a self-conducted tour of the battlefield and its associated locations.


Paul Skrebels

The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan

David Kilcullen and Greg Mills

Hurst, 2021

Paperback, \$29.99



At the end of any prolonged conflict there is a period of reflection, analysis and accounting. Typically, journalists and commentators are the first to contribute to these postwar discussions. Intimately involved in the process of nation-building and counterinsurgency were David Kilcullen and Greg Mills who, in *The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan*, provide a detailed and clear appraisal of the outcomes. The book explores the West's involvement in Afghanistan following 9/11 until the seizure of power by the Taliban.

Through close analysis of political, diplomatic and military aspects of the conflict, Kilcullen and Mills develop a series of lessons that they see as key to understanding why the West failed. Their criticism is unreserved and uncompromising. While this is paramount to understanding the outcome, the authors also conclude with a warning of potentially similar events happening in Africa.

The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan is recommended reading for anyone interested in what went wrong in Afghanistan and how to prevent a repetition.


Justin Chadwick

Lavarack: Rival General (revised edition)

Brett Lodge

Robinson Reynolds, 2021

Paperback, \$32.99



It is not often that an author has an opportunity to revisit and revise a published work. Not only are the inevitable typographical errors rectified, but new material may become available, particularly archives that were previously inaccessible. Brett Lodge is one such (lucky) author to have the chance to return to an earlier work. First

published in 1998, *Lavarack: Rival General* established itself as the premier biography on the general. Lodge's treatment of a Staff Corps officer who persevered during the lean interwar period, successfully commanded troops in North Africa and Syria, but fell foul of Blamey, is detailed and nuanced.

Like many senior officers, Lavarack was a driven soldier who was unafraid to speak his mind to fellow officers and his political masters. His vociferous argument against the Singapore strategy and the need for Army reform as war neared in the late 1930s were both vindicated. His command of the 7th Australian Division proved his knowledge and skills as a leader, quickly preparing his men for battle. He was praised by senior British officers, such as Wavell and Wilson, which attracted the displeasure of Blamey. With the ongoing Staff Corps versus militia officer clash in the background, Blamey, seeing Lavarack as a rival for the role of commander-in-chief, used Lavarack's fiery temper and impulsiveness as a reason to sideline him.

Reading the book again reinforces the personality clashes that came to the fore as Australia was fighting its overseas war. Although Lavarack had an acerbic nature at times that alienated junior officers, he had, at all times, the country's best interests in mind. The additional material that Lodge has collated and included means *Lavarack: Rival General* will continue to be the best major biography of the officer and man.


Justin Chadwick

Honouring a Nation: A History of Australia's Honours System

Karen Fox

Australian National University Press, 2022

Paperback \$55.00/free download from ANU Press



Inherited from the British Empire, Australia has had a system of civil and military honours since the country's beginning as a modern nation. While initially structured around that of Britain, Australia's own system has—despite a brief time under the prime ministership of Tony Abbott—been used exclusively since its introduction. The history of the honours system in Australia is the subject of this book. All facets of the honours system are explored by Fox: history, meaning, controversy and its changing role in Australia.

While the British system of honours has been widely studied, the Australian system has not and *Honouring a Nation* fills this gap.

Justin Chadwick

Technology

The Malkara: Australia's Wire Guided Missile

Rohan Goyne

Derived from an indigenous word for shield, Malkara was an Australian wire guided missile that was adopted by the British Army after its successful field testing by the Australian Government Aircraft Factories at Woomera in South Australia.

The Malkara had a steel and magnesium body with cylindrical front and rear sections. The centre section of the missile was square to which the four pivoting wings made from foam filled glass cloth were attached. The four fixed tail fins were indexed at 45 degrees to the wings.

The Malkara's engine was a dual-thrust solid-propellant rocket motor that relied on a conventional wire guidance system. It carried a 23kg high explosive warhead with a total weight of 88.8kgs and had a range of 457m – 3,657m at a speed of 526 k.p.h.

The missile was developed between 1951-1954 and was in service from 1958. Overall, 1000 were produced. The development testing of the weapon was undertaken at the Woomera Prohibited Area (see Image 2 and 3).



Image 1: Malkara prototype. Source: NAA A1200, L32881.

Although a secret development program, the British Department of Defence Production shared information on the project. In January 1958 the British discussed the possibility of jointly developing a wire guided antitank missile with France. Each country was developing its own system and the British sought economies. It was soon found that the



two systems were too dissimilar. However, the French SS12 and Australian Malkara projects had more in common. While a joint project was not deemed practicable, Australia may gain from collaboration with the French. Representatives of the departments of Supply and Defence Production in London recommended approval be given for a French representative visit Australia to explore the possibility of negotiations, licensing arrangements or supply to NATO countries.

Image 2: Malkara testing at Woomera.
Source: NAA A1200, L32882.

While this came to nothing, the Malkara was adopted by the Australian and British armies, influencing the development of the British Seacat surface to air missile and the Australian anti- submarine missile Ikara.



Image 3: Malkara testing at Woomera.
Source: NAA B941, AIRCRAFT/NAVAL and MILITARY/1.

Society Matters

George Ward Fellowship

The federal council of the MHSA is pleased to announce the appointment of George War as a Fellow of the Society. George Ward joined the Geelong branch of the MHSA in 1976. Living in Melbourne he became the liaison officer between the Geelong and the Victorian branches, joining the latter in 1981. He has been a driving force of the organisation for many years, holding executive appointments. He was president between 1985 and 1988, treasurer for over ten years and secretary for many years and still going as secretary in 2021. At the national level, George was the force behind organising and conducting the very successful national conferences in 1992 and 2010 in Melbourne. George has also written articles for *Sabretache*, reflecting a high order of knowledge in the field of military history. He is an avid promoter of military history, helping organise large scale events. He was on the committee that organised Victorian Military Expo in 1984, one of the biggest in its day, that promoted the MHSA and military history. He openly promotes the MHSA at every chance he has.

His interest in military history is wide. Through his local RSL sub-branch at Ringwood, George has aided in cataloguing and displaying their memorabilia collection and leads visiting groups through. He has a strong involvement in the National Boer War Memorial Association which he is treasurer. Over the years George has attended many conferences, presented papers, and is well known at such events. He has published *Victorian Land Forces 1853-1883*, *Bayswater Heroes and Patriots: World War Two* and *Selected to see the King: a List of Australians who as soldiers attended the Coronation of King Edward the VII*. He also is an avid collector of militaria especially Boer War memorabilia. George has worked tirelessly for Legacy over the past few years.

George is a hard worker, a respected member of the Victorian Branch of the MHSA and a welcome addition to the fellowship.



MHSA BRANCH OFFICE BEARERS

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

President	Ian Stagoll 165 Belconnen Way Hawker ACT 2614 ian.stagoll@gmail.com 02 6254 0199	2.00pm, last Thursday of the month, Jan to Nov Canberra Southern Cross Club, Jamison
Secretary/Treasurer	James Smith canberrabomber@gmail.com 0414 946 909	

QUEENSLAND

President	Neil Dearberg	2nd Saturday Jan, Mar
Vice President	Russell Paten	May, Jul, Sep and Nov
Secretary/Treasurer	Ian Curtis PO Box 243 Maleny QLD 4552	various locations South East Queensland

SOUTH AUSTRALIA

President	Elizabeth Hobbs	7.30pm, 2nd Friday of each month, except Good Friday Army Museum of SA, Keswick Barracks, Anzac Highway, Keswick
Secretary	Paul Skrebels PO Box 247, Marden SA 5070 paulnray@bigpond.com	
Treasurer	John Spencer	

VICTORIA

President	Leigh Ryan	8pm, 4th Thursday of each month except December Oakleigh RSL Drummond Street, Oakleigh
Secretary	George Ward PO Box 854, Croydon Vic 3136 geofw46@outlook.com	
Treasurer	Bill Black	

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

President	Steven Danaher	3rd Wednesday of every month, Officers' Mess, Army Museum of WA, Artillery Barracks, Burt St, Fremantle
Secretary	Richard Farrar 2a Zamia St, Mt Claremont WA 6010 wasec@mhsa.org.au	
Treasurer	Dick Kagi	